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The Smart Energy Collective (SEC) is an alliance of international and Dutch companies that 
agreed to collaborate on the development of a Universal Smart Energy Framework (USEF) 
that can act as a catalyst for the development of commercially viable smart energy systems 
at an international scale. The international perspective is important with respect to privacy 
& security as rules and regulations can differ significantly between countries and continents. 
In the European Union (EU), processing of personal data is covered by the Data Protection 
Directive which is scheduled to be replaced by the recently unveiled draft European Data 
Protection Regulation. SEC has asked Prof. Mireille Hildebrandt of the Radboud University 
Nijmegen to assess the implications of current privacy laws and regulations as well as gauging 
(near) future developments in this area. In this report SEC presents her brief, well-thought 
out reflection on the legal requirements for a level playing field on which all stakeholders may 
pursue maximum value creation using smart energy services in a smart grid environment.© 2013 Prof. dr. Mireille Hildebrandt, Chair of Smart Environments, Data Protection and the Rule 
of Law, Institute of Computing and Information Sciences (iCIS), Privacy & Identity Lab, Radboud 
Universiteit Nijmegen and Smart Energy Collective, Arnhem, the Netherlands.
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This study entails a reflection on the legal requirements for a level playing field on which 
all stakeholders in the future Smart Grid may pursue maximum value creation. It has been 
commissioned by the Smart Energy Collective, and aims to respond in a coherent way to the 
following set of questions:
 A summary of the present legal requirements that originate from the current European 
legislation [Chapter 2]
 What are potential design implications of the latitude for (national) implementation that the 
European directives allow? [Sections 3.4 and 4.4.1]
 What are potential design implications of the European Data Protection Regulation that has 
recently been proposed? [Chapter 2, further discussed in chapter 4]
 How should one interpret the increasing disconnect between the current geographically 
defined laws and regulations and social and economic developments that supersede the 
jurisdiction of the nation-state? [Sections 4.1.2; 4.4]
 What are relevant legal and social developments that might impact the design of smart energy 
systems which can be expected in the upcoming decades? [Chapters 1, 2]
 Does the number one security goal of availability for critical infrastructure systems impose 
(legal) restrictions on the use of data streams in smart energy systems? [Section 3.3]
 Should the creation of added value on data used for system optimization be allowed? [Sections 
2.2.6; 2.2.7; 3.3; 4.1.4.1; 4.1.7] 
 Should added value creation through ancillary energy services be based on a separate data 
stream? [Sections  2.2.6; 2.2.7; 3.3; 4.1.4.1; 4.1.7]
 Do the costs associated with investment in security expertise to prevent substantial privacy 
breaches drown out the supposed benefits? [Sections 3.3; 4.1.10.1; 4.1.10.2]
The challenges formulated in these questions relate to two notions that are fundamental for a 
sustainable ICT infrastructures such as the Smart Grid:
1. Intuitive transparency with regard to the potential consequences of sharing one’s data.
2. Default hardwired contextual integrity that does not put the burden of protecting against 
undesired profiling on the shoulder of individual consumers.
Preface
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As indicated in the preface this study1 entails a reflection on the legal requirements for a level playing field on which all 
stakeholders may pursue maximum value creation using smart energy services in a smart grid environment. A serious 
roll-out of the Smart Grid will require various types of predictive modelling to achieve a more balanced management of 
resources, notably when the system should enable demand response, decentralization of energy supply, the growth of 
a new type of ‘prosumers’, the institution of local markets for energy exchange, and the integration of various types of 
renewable energy (e.g. solar and wind). The challenges faced by the introduction of a new system for energy generation, 
distribution, transport and exchange reside in safeguarding its resilience in the face of natural disasters, malicious attacks, 
market disruptions and system breakdowns. On top of that the usage of advanced data analytics to achieve load balancing, 
desirable pricing incentives as well as resilience may impact human rights and civil liberties such as privacy and data 
protection, especially the right to profile transparency. 
Introduction
in the level of trust that is needed for a smooth operation of 
the infrastructure. Referring to the financial crisis it should 
be clear that linking a Smart Grid to potentially volatile 
financial markets can easily undermine consumer trust 
and stifle innovation. The same goes for a Smart Grid that 
comes to depend on business models that trade personal 
data and personalized profiles based on anonymized data. 
Once consumers realize that they are being targeted in 
ways that cannot be foreseen, while these profiles will 
have a major influence on their life, they may refrain from 
endorsing the Smart Grid. This will frustrate the objectives 
set out in European legislation and those of various 
industry initiatives. The point is not to obstruct the vision of 
the Smart Grid but to investigate how it can model itself on 
the future requirements of Data Protection by Design and 
Default, as introduced in the draft General Data Protection 
Regulation of the European Union. 
For this reason, an important sub-question will be:
How is the right to profile-transparency articulated within 
the EU legal framework and how can this right be turned 
into an effective right without necessarily destroying 
business models based on value added services? 
Finally, the notion of value added services requires an 
investigation into how energy end-users can become 
partners in the production of data and data derivatives 
instead of merely being a cognitive resource for the 
personal data economy run by short term commercial 
interests. This involves a second sub-question:
How can energy consumers be involved in future 
business-models as data prosumers, sharing the benefits 
of advanced data analytics? Can we have our cakes and 
eat them too: enjoy the benefits of personalized services 
without losing all control over how we are being profiled? 
Mireille Hildebrandt,  
Nijmegen 14th January 2013
Chair of Smart Environments, Data Protection 
and the Rule of Law
iCIS, Radboud University Nijmegen
PILab
Next to these major challenges so-called Energy Service 
Companies (ESCos), seen as third parties with regard 
to energy supply and demand,2 will create value added 
services that should incentivize end-users to reorganize 
their energy consumption in a way that (1) reduces their 
energy requirements, (2) reduces CO2 emissions, (3) 
enhances the network’s resilience, and if possible, (4) 
enables them to generate renewable energy to be fed back 
to the net. These value added service will often require 
access to Big Data, thus enabling reliable predictive user 
modelling, which poses new threats to privacy & data 
protection, non-discrimination and due process. 
The focus of this study will therefore be on the implications 
of data analytics and profiling rather than merely on the 
storage of personal data. We note that the introduction 
of the smart meter has already provided for numerous 
studies of its impact on the privacy and data-protection 
of end-consumers. In the Netherlands this has led to the 
statutory right to refuse the installation of a smart meter, or 
– for those with a smart meter - the right to refuse to have 
personal data sent to the network operator. The question 
in this study will not be whether smart meters violate the 
privacy of individual users, but:
Which should be the requirements for the complex network 
of machine-to-machine interactions within the Smart Grid 
so as to prevent illegitimate and unlawful violations of 
privacy law and data protection legislation? 
Such requirements are preconditions for a trustworthy 
infrastructure capable of resisting dangerous fluctuations 
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Second, a typology is developed of potential technical 
solutions, mapping various types of proposed 
solutions together to increase understanding of 
different strategies to safeguard privacy and data 
protection. While these strategies may overlap and often 
address similar problems, they thus provide a multilevel 
approach capable of preventing, resolving or balancing 
infringements of fundamental rights.3 The types developed 
in this study are not meant to be exhaustive and depending 
on the context other listings could make more sense. The 
following 7 types are distinguished in relation to legal 
requirements for the Smart Grid:
1. Separation of data streams, end-2-end encryption and 
secure authentication;
2. Personal data vaults or similar solutions;
3. Privacy preserving data mining [PPDM] and 
aggregation techniques to achieve anonymisation;
4. Management of credentials instead of identification;
5. Metadata, semantic web and agreement technologies;
6. Discrimination aware data mining [DADM];
7. User centric personal data ecosystems [PDE).
Chapter 2 ends with a set of general recommendations, 
that is repeated in the conclusions (see below).
Chapters 3 and 4 form the legal backbone of this study. 
They provide an overview of the relevant EU legal framework 
that enables and constrains the development of the 
Smart Grid. The legal requirements discussed in chapter 
2 have been derived from these chapters, mostly from 
chapter 4.
Chapter 3 elaborates the EU legal framework for the 
energy market, starting with the right to universal service 
that underpins the legislative framework of the critical 
infrastructure. This chapter presents the objectives of 
energy efficiency, enery usage from renewable sources, the 
constraints of the internal energy market; the introduction 
of the smart meter; the need for and requirements of the 
Cost Benefit Analysis; and the margin of appreciation for 
the MSs. 
Chapter 4 elaborates the EU legal framework of relevant 
fundamental rights with a clear focus on data protection 
legislation. In view of the proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation that is expected to come into force by 2016 at 
the latest the current and future law on data protection is 
discussed similtaneously as much as possible, detailing 
the more stringent approach of the Regulation in terms of 
enforcement, auditibility and liability. 
Chapter 5 provides succinct answers to the research 
questions raised in the introduction, followed by the 
following set of general recommendations:
 1. Think in terms of data flows instead of isolated 
discrete data; foresee whether de-anonymisation will 
reinstate identifiability and treat data streams that are 
susceptible to such de-anonymisation as falling within 
the scope of data protection legislation.
 2. Make privacy and security an essential part of your 
business-model, do not treat them as costs but as a 
competitive advantage – especially in the long run.
 3. Start from and reiterate Data Protection Impact 
Assessments.
 4. Practice Data Protection by Design and by Default.
 5. Develop software tools and hardware infrastructure 
that is innovative in terms of DPbDesign and by Default.
 6. Develop business models based on DPbDesign and 
by Default.
 7. Practice Security by Design, notably end-to-end 
encryption and secure authentication wherever 
possible.
 8. Invest in recurrent software analyses.
 9. Practice discrimination-aware data mining.
10. Base your trust management on trustworthiness.
11. Never underestimate the recurrent cost of safety and 
security.
12. Don’t allow critical infrastructure to depend on volatile 
markets.
13. Create separate data streams for (1) critical 
infrastructure that protects the right to universal 
service, and (2) commercial value added services.
14. Design profile transparency in the back-end of the 
Smart Grid system.
15. Design intuitive interfaces that provide transparency 
about the potential consequences of sharing one’s 
data (showing what profiles they match).
16. Design for profile transparency in the front-end of the 
Smart Grid system (allow consumers to play around 
with their data to figure out how they are matched).
In chapter 1 the notions of the Smart Grid, Profiling 
technologies and Legal protection by design are 
discussed, refined and defined. 
1. The Smart Grid is distinguished from the smart 
meter and explained from the perspective of the EU 
legal framework, since this will set the constraints 
that should enable the achievement of a Smart Grid 
infrastructure within the EU. The working definition 
highlights the visionary and ambitious nature of the 
idea of the Smart Grid, that is expected to enable 
distributed energy generation, the uploading of 
renewable energy by individual households, flexible 
pricing incentives, granular information on energy 
consumption of final users, remote reading and remote 
control for network operators, demand response and 
real-time load balancing. In chapter 3 the EU legal 
framework for energy efficiency, renewable energy in 
the EU internal market is further elaborated. 
2. The notion of profiling technologies or data analytics 
is explained as conditional for many aspects of the 
Smart Grid as envisioned today. Profiling will determine 
the ‘smartness’ of the grid and and basically involves 
techniques of artificial intelligence, such as machine 
learning and other types of smart automation. Profiling 
will also inform the interventions of energy service 
companies that should offer value added services 
to customers are expected to contribute to energy 
savings. 
3. Finally, the notion of legal protection by design (LPbD) 
is introduced and discussed, referring to the need 
to pay trained attention to potential infringements of 
fundamental rights by emerging technologies, notable 
by profiling technologies. LPbD insists that the legal 
requirements of fundamental rights such as privacy 
and data protection must be translated into computer 
system hardware, code, protocols and organisational 
standards to sustain the effectiveness of such right in 
a changing technological landscape.
Chapter 2 presents potential technical solutions that could 
help achieve legal protection by design in smart grids. This 
chapter is the follow-up of the legal analysis of chapter 4 
that develops the legal requirements of the fundamental 
rights of data protection, privacy and non-discrimination 
with respect to the smart grid. It is presented up-front 
because it presents the outcome of the study in practical 
terms. In that sense this chapter forms the core of the 
report. 
First, the legal requirements for the Smart Grid (as further 
elaborated in chapter 4), are discussed and matched with 
proposals for LPbD. These legal requirements are in no 
way exhaustive, but hope to mark the most salient outline 
of the complex system of rights and obligations for data 
processing in the context of the Smart Grid. 
This involves legal requirements of:
 Right to Universal Service;
 Legal certainty and level playing field in the EU;
 Energy usage behaviour as personal data;
 Data Protection Impact Assessment;
 Confidentiality & security by design;
 Fair processing;
 Consumer-driven added value services;
 Sensitive data and non-discrimination;
 Consent;
 The right to be forgotten;
 Data portability;
 Measures based on profiling;
 Liability of data controllers and processors.
Executive Summary
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The advantage of acknowledging this as a working 
definition is that it stays within the legal framework that 
determines the constraints that restrict and enable the 
envisaged EU energy market. 
1.2 Profiling technologies and data 
derivatives
The Smart Grid is smart to the extent that it integrates 
data analytics. In theory, these analytics could be 
‘dumb’ in the sense of not being leveraged by machine 
learning techniques, merely providing precise data on 
energy usage.7 It is, however, difficult to imagine that 
the enormous mass of data would mean anything to 
anybody if not mined for relevant patterns and explained 
by means of e.g. visual analytics, to provide information 
instead of mere data (which easily turns into noise). This is 
especially relevant in the case of load balancing (achieving 
optimal energy availability without costly storage for peak 
consumption) and flexible pricing strategies that should 
incentivize energy savings (based on short term and long 
term demand response). 
Profiling technologies are based on data analytics. They 
entail two types of profiling that feed on each other. 
 First, they allow for the construction of relevant profiles 
out of massive amounts of data. This process is often 
called knowledge discovery in databases (KDD); it 
seeks to mine non-obvious patterns in databases 
which allow for the construction of new insights that 
could not have been deducted or induced with the 
naked human eye. The inferences derived from big 
data can be coined as data derivatives.8
 Second, profiling technologies allow for the application 
of profiles to new data, often to predict certain 
behaviours. As such, these data derivatives can 
be monetized and traded, just like their financial 
namesakes.
The application of profiles mined on the basis of smart 
data analytics can be used as a recurrent if not permanent 
and real-time test of the construction of the profiles. This 
allows a continuous process of refinement and adaptation, 
for instance in response to changed circumstances. 
This functionality implies the learning capacity of 
profiling technologies and demonstrates that its artificial 
intelligence (AI) cannot be compared to that of the ’80s 
of the last century (top-down context-insensitive good old 
fashioned artificial intelligence: GOFAI). Machine learning is 
generally defined as the capacity of machines to improve 
their performance based on feedback. In that sense we 
must define profiling technologies as part of the modern 
approach of artificial intelligence (AIMA).9 It is closely 
related to and preconditional for proactive, adaptive and 
autonomic computing.
In relation to the Smart Grid profiling technologies are 
relevant at two levels. First, they are part of the ‘smartness’ 
of the grid, they allow for the data collected by automated 
remote readers to be used for demand response, load 
balancing, pricing strategies and for safeguarding energy 
availability as well as the various levels of security within 
the grid. Profiling technologies are – obviously – meant to 
enhance the reliability and versatility of the grid. However, 
one can imagine that some of the inherent unpredictability 
of e.g. machine learning creates fascinating risks for 
the critical infrastructure. This relates to security, energy 
availability, safety and overall costs. But is also relates to 
vulnerabilities related to the creation of added value based 
on data mined from the grid. This refers to the second 
level of relevance of profiling for the Smart Grid. Profiling 
technologies are part and parcel of the energy services to 
be provided by ESCos. For instance, Nest Labs in the US 
develops a smart thermostat that helps end-user energy 
saving behaviour:10
by studying its owner’s habits and predicting things 
about when people are home and what they are likely to 
do with their home heating and cooling. (…) The device 
also collects enough data that Nest can start to draw 
from really large data sets on consumption and correlate 
that knowledge with information from other sources, like 
weather forecasts, to make a more powerful product. (…) 
Tony Fadell, Nest’s founder and chief executive. “We can 
gather all that data, mix it with other data we store in the 
cloud, and push different algorithms to different houses 
to see how people react”. That approach, continually 
testing one feature against another and going with the one 
that consumers responds to best, is called A/B testing 
when done with Internet software. It is how Google and 
others make their products. As more physical objects fill 
up with software and develop two-way interactions with 
the network, Mr. Fadell says, they can be developed the 
same way. 
This rather extensive quote should sensitize us to the 
rather optimistic expectations based on the mining of 
1.1 Smart Grid
As yet, the Smart Grid is a vision, and different stakeholders 
tend to come up with different objectives, definitions and 
conditions. Strict definitions are unwise at this stage, 
since it is still unclear how the Smart Grid will finally come 
to pass. In this study I will focus on the vision of the EU 
legislator which has defined the Smart Grid as follows:4 
‘smart grid’ means an upgraded energy network to which 
two-way digital communication between the supplier and 
consumer, smart metering and monitoring and control 
systems have been added.
As a background we can note that the present energy 
infrastructure in the EU is found to be in need of revision, 
while the foreseen energy needs in ICT-enabled societies 
are expected to surge. At the same time the targets for 
the reduction of CO2 emissions have to be met. The idea 
is that a combination of savings on energy consumption, 
generation of renewable energy, real time distribution 
on the basis of demand response and pricing strategies 
that incentivize to achieve load-balancing will do the job. 
These policies are deemed conditional for (1) meeting 
future energy demand, (2) less dependence on fossil fuels 
that must be imported from outside Europe, (3) reducing 
CO2 emissions and (4) lowering the overall cost of energy 
consumption. At the same time the Smart Grid should 
(5) facilitate the Smart Home that allows for ubiquitous 
machine-to-machine communication between various 
devices within –and possibly without - the home, combining 
remote control, smart automation of home appliances, 
transparency and control for the user with energy saving. 
This is connected to the notion of domotica that foresees 
further integration of various types of robots into the 
home environment, and remote healthcare that allows 
people to stay home despite serious disabilities or old 
age.5 Finally, the Smart Grid should (6) facilitate increasing 
use of electrical vehicles, maybe one day resulting in the 
smart car that combines traffic management, safe driving, 
energy savings and reduced pollution.6
The Smart Meter is the interface between consumers and 
the Smart Grid and basically the enabler of the two-way 
communication between individual end-users, the smart 
home, the smart car and the Smart Grid. As such the 
Smart Meter will determine who gets to see and handle 
what data or information and under what conditions. Its 
characteristics are the capacity for remote reading, remote 
control and the mentioned two-way communication. 
A more detailed working definition of the Smart Grid, as 
conceptualised in the European legal framework, involves 
the following dimensions:
 Distributed energy generation by individual households, 
windmill parks, industry
 Integration of renewable energy sources that can be 
fed back into the GRID
 Granular pricing strategies that incentivize energy 
saving and load balancing
 Smart metering that provides for two-way 
communication between the end-user and the GRID
 Smart metering that provides end-users, network 
operators, suppliers and – possibly also - ESCos with 
granular information on energy consumption of the 
end-user
 Smart metering that provides for remote reading and 
remote control for the network operator, suppliers and 
the end-user
 A move from supply-side energy markets to demand-
response
 Real-time load-balancing based on real-time metering 
and predictive analytics
1 Defining the Smart Grid, 
 Profiling Technologies and  
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requirements must be built into the infrastructure, re-
creating an environment that fosters individual autonomy, 
treats us as worthy of equal concern and respect and 
provides intuitive transparency about the consequences 
of our interactions with the Smart Grid.   
These requirements are not only ethical obligations for 
those investing in the Smart Grid. They refer to the Fair 
Information Principles (FIPs) that have been codified as 
law in many jurisdictions, notably in the EU Data Protection 
framework which will be discussed in the next section. 
The imperative that legal protection should be built into 
the ICT infrastructure has been termed legal protection by 
design.12 We can define this as:
 Paying trained attention to the potential infringements 
of fundamental rights by emerging technologies, such 
as profiling technologies;
 Taking note of the risks inherent in trading with data 
derivatives;
 Developing legal requirements that fit the architecture 
and design of novel technological infrastructures, such 
as the Smart Grid;
 Translating these legal requirements into computer 
system hardware, code, protocols and organisational 
standards;
 Engaging lawyers, computer engineers, software 
developers and designers of human machine interfaces 
in the process of constructing new technologies and 
infrastructures;
 Taking the protection of fundamental rights and the 
checks and balances of democracy and the Rule 
of Law as a basic premise and goal of the whole 
enterprise;
 Thus levelling the playing field for the industry and other 
stakeholders to create added value based on business 
models that integrate the protection of fundamental 
rights into their core business.
Big Data and should warn us against a number of risks 
and uncertainties that could develop from careless 
experimentation with consumer energy consumption 
behaviour. If at any point consumers suspect that their 
behaviours are used to manipulate them, they may lose 
faith. Moreover, it may be that foreign intelligence services 
decide to take a look at such data, which may be less 
complex if they are stored in clouds with mandatory 
backdoors or failing security.11 If such spying becomes 
known, consumers may again lose faith. Trust may 
plummet and to the extent that added value services draw 
their data from the critical infrastructure this may cause 
havoc for the Smart Grid.
Acknowledging that profiling technologies entail AI is 
important for three reasons: 
1. They will enable the required automated responses 
that should make the future Grid Smart.
2. They will have a major influence on the vulnerability 
of the Smart Grid, due to safety and security risks 
generated by the inherent unpredictability of their 
automation.
3. They will have a profound impact on privacy, data 
protection, non-discrimination and due process, 
further intensified in the case of trading with data 
derivatives.
1.3 Legal Protection By Design 
The information and communication technology (ICT) 
infrastructure co-determines the bandwidth of social 
intercourse and determines how we perceive and cognize 
the world outside our immediate surroundings. Writing, 
the printing press and mass media have their own specific 
affordances as to how we perceive, understand and 
control our environment. The legal framework depends on 
the ICT infrastructure to orient, allow, prohibit or prescribe 
our interactions. Written law provides a particular type 
of legal certainty, based on written sources of law that 
provide a relatively stable staple of authoritative texts 
(codes, treaties, case-law, doctrinal treatises). This has 
created a need for interpretation, which delays and refines 
the judgment that decides the meaning of written codes. 
One could see this requirement of interpretation as an 
example of the transportation and distribution of meaning. 
Interestingly the availability of relatively stable resources 
and the delays of transportation and distribution are 
not only core to the modern legal system that is based 
on written, enacted codes and authoritative, written 
judgments. They also define the 20th century notion of 
energy providing infrastructure: energy is kept in store to 
meet future needs; transport and distribution are defined 
by the delays inherent in supply side economics. With the 
advance of smart interconnected ICT infrastructures such 
as the Internet, the World Wide Web and its numerous 
applications, complemented with mobile and wireless 
communication networks we can detect a shift from an 
infrastructure based on delays and stabilized resources 
towards a real-time and reduced-stock infrastructure. 
Whether this development is good or bad is not the topic 
of this study. Whether it is feasible and will indeed lead to 
reduced-stock energy management is another question, 
also not part of this study. 
The law, however, needs to anticipate how these changes 
may affect its basic premises. The idea that written legal 
norms can coordinate the implicit affordances of smart 
infrastructures seems inadequate; the only way to ensure 
the sustainability of fundamental rights and liberties is 
to inscribe or design them into the architecture of the 
infrastructure. Unless we invent, engineer and design the 
smart grid in a way that meets the legal requirements of 
privacy and data protection, the Grid may simply collect 
and trade our energy consumption data with whoever 
pays best. Unless we invent, engineer and design the 
Smart Grid in a way that meets the legal requirements 
of non-discrimination and due process the Grid may 
enable insurance companies, law enforcement agencies, 
potential employers or credit brokers to discriminate us 
on the basis of an inferred pregnancy, religious affiliation, 
tax-evasion-behaviours or credit risk. The problem may 
either be that it allows for invisible unlawful discrimination, 
or it may be that lawful discrimination goes undetected. 
In both cases we have no idea of the profiles that match 
our data and therefore we have no idea how to change or 
hide behaviour to prevent undesirable discrimination. Our 
inferred preferences can be manipulated if we don’t know 
that or how we have been profiled: we cannot defend 
ourselves against incorrect inferences and we cannot 
learn how our energy consumption behaviours impact 
the way we are treated. To remedy this situation certain 
Legal Protection by Design in Smart Grids
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a. data minimisation; 
b. meaningful consent; 
c. data portability; 
d. the right to forget;
e. profile transpanency. 
3. Various types of user participation should be 
organised, and the ability of users to understand 
the implications of their choices as well as their 
monitored behaviour should be ensured. 
4. Designs that allow for high frequency trading with 
energy consumption behaviours (and the inferred data 
derivatives) must be avoided or at least separated from 
the data streams of the critical infrastructure since they 
will not empower the end-user and may cause volatility 
and unpredictable disruption of energy supply.
2.1.5 Legal requirements of confidentiality & security 
by design (section 4.1.10.2)
1. Security by Design seems to be a prerequisite for 
a resilient infrastructure, since the cost of security 
breaches and ensuing system breakdowns would be 
exponential. 
 Proposals for Data Protection by Design
a. End-to-end encryption seems indeed imperative. It 
is unclear to me why this is not mandatory law. 
b. Especially in the case of remote readings and 
wireless machine-to-machine communication 
between the Smart Grid and domotica, many 
security incidents can be prevented by imposing 
end-to-end encryption. 
c. The economics of security warrant a separation of 
the data stream of the critical infrastructure from 
that of value added services.  
2.1.6 Legal requirements for fair processing  
(section 4.1.4 and 4.1.5)
1. In the context of the Smart Grid it would be advisable 
to separate data streams based on necessity 
(contract, legal obligation, vital interests of the user, 
public interest, legitimate interests of the controller) 
from those based on consent. 
2. Since consent can be withdrawn at any time, it does 
not provide for a stable data stream; fluctuating trust 
levels around value added services could endanger 
the reliability of the Smart Grid or the availability of 
energy - if data streams are not separated.
3. Note should be taken that data streams based on 
consent must still comply with the conditions of 
data minimisation (i.e. purpose specification and use 
limitation, accuracy and completeness, and deletion 
or anonymisation as soon as the purpose is no longer 
relevant).
 Proposals for Data Protection by Design and by 
Default:
a. It may save trouble to provide metadata for each 
data with the ground on which its processing is 
based, code for the purpose of processing and for 
the type of recipient of the data. This could make it 
easier to comply with transparency and auditability 
obligations and could fit with software that allows 
end-users to access their data in a format that 
easily sorts different types of data in a handsome 
overview. 
b. To the extent that such metadata function as sticky 
policies that determine how they can be shared and 
used, they could implement data minimisation and 
fulfil the requirements of data minimisation. They 
could thus enable what the proposed Regulation 
means with ‘Data protection by default’. 
c. Special care should be taken to prevent that 
metadata generate more or more serious data 
protection vulnerabilities than they aim to solve.
d. Another option would be to put data in a personal 
data closet with an intelligent agent that checks, 
records, remembers, calculates which data are 
with whom/what on what grounds, for what 
purpose, and which types of third parties may 
assess them.
e. In the contexts of the Smart Grid DPbDefault entails 
very strict default settings for the data stream of 
the critical infrastructure itself, preferably hardwired 
into the architecture. 
f. At the same time it should provide similar – 
softwired - technical protection for data streams 
that nourish the applications of ESCos, requiring 
them to clarify on the basis of machine-to-machine 
communication what data they need for what 
purpose, providing transparency for any secondary 
use (such as selling the data or data derivatives). 
This can be achieved by use of meta-data with 
sticky policies and/or agreement technologies. 
g. This could be combined with a software tool that 
allows only credentials for value-added services, 
e.g. integrated with a personal data vault, and an 
intelligent agent (agreement technologies).
2 Legal Protection by Design  
in the Smart Grid
2.1 Legal Requirements, with proposals for 
‘legal protection by design’
This chapter provides a set of proposals for legal 
protection by design. In this section the proposals are 
mapped according to the legal norms they may help to 
articulate. For an elaboration of the legal framework see 
chapter 3 (EU Energy Market) and especially chapter 4 
(Fundamental Rights Protection).
Each heading refers to a legal right or obligation, formulated 
in terms of legal requirements for the Smart Grid and/or 
relevant stakeholders. The requirements are based on the 
current and the proposed upcoming legal framework, for 
explanation see the section to which the headings refer. 
If possible, these requirements are then translated into 
proposals for legal protection by design. These proposals 
are not meant as exhaustive and are not necessarily 
compulsory.  
2.1.1 Right to Universal Service  
(section 3.1.1)
1. Everyone has the right to access energy services. 
This imposes obligations on service providers to offer 
defined energy services under specified conditions, 
notably complete territorial coverage and affordable 
pricing. 
2.1.2 Legal certainty and level playing field in the EU 
(section 4.1.2)
1. The introduction of a General Data Protection 
Regulation with direct legal effect in all the Member 
States entails that for all companies operating in the 
EU it becomes profitable to develop standards that 
articulate default compliance with EU data protection 
rights and obligations, since the legal requirements will 
be uniform across the EU. 
2. All the legal rights and obligations stipulated in the 
proposed Regulation must be implemented by means 
of appropriate technical and organisational measures 
and procedures. The appropriateness will depend on 
the state of the art and the costs of implementation: 
technical and economic feasibility will determine the 
extent of a data controller’s obligations. 
3. Any business that wishes to engage with data 
processing of EU citizens will have to comply with EU 
data protection by design. The risk of effective liability, 
high fines and reputation damage will enforce a level 
playing field that will have a substantial impact on the 
standards of data protection worldwide.
2.1.3 Energy usage behaviour as personal data 
(section 4.1.3)
1. In the context of the Smart Grid all data on energy 
consumption should best be treated as personal data, 
taking into account that data aggregation or other 
techniques for anonymisation can reduce but not 
eradicate the risk of de-anonymisation. 
2. This means that for all data streams containing energy 
usage data a Data Protection Impact Assessment will 
be required (see below) and Data Protection by Design 
and by Default (see below) must be implemented. 
3. Note that in this view aggregation or anonymisation 
techniques can be viable implementations of 
DPbDefault, but do not render Data Protection 
legislation inapplicable.
2.1.4 Legal requirement of a Data Protection Impact 
Assessment (DPIA) (section 4.1.10.1)
1. Smart Grid initiators should not await the Commission’s 
template but actively foresee the kind of impact the Grid 
may have on data protection rights and obligations.
2. They should envisage how alternative designs impact 
e.g.: 
Legal Protection by Design in Smart Grids
18
Prof. mr. dr. Mireille Hildebrandt of Radboud University Nijmegen
19
2.1.11 Legal requirement of data portability  
(section 4.1.8.2)
1. Data portability means that a data subject can obtain 
her energy usage data from the DNO and/or supplier, 
or from the ESCo that was processing them.
2. The data must be provided in an electronic and 
structured format, e.g. via a secure online environment, 
or on a disc, or the data could be transferred 
straightaway to the new supplier or ESCo, or even 
deposited in a personal data vault.
3. Since the DNO is the party that transfers relevant data 
to the suppliers or to the ESCo, it is not clear what data 
portability could mean in relation to the DNO. Should 
we foresee a time when DNOs are in competition 
across MSs?
4. The system may be designed in a way that keeps the 
data in a personal data vault, giving the data subject 
control over who gets to access the data. In that case 
portability is not the issue, but the right to be forgotten 
by the previous supplier or ESCo remains pertinent.
2.1.12 Legal requirements for measures based on 
profiling (section 4.1.8.3)
1. Measures based solely on automated profiling are 
prohibited, except in the case of a legal obligation, a 
contract or consent. 
2. Profiling on the basis of energy usage data can be 
based on a legal obligation (e.g. national legislation 
that stipulates the roll-out of smart meters and load 
balancing). 
3. It can also be based on the contract with the energy 
supplier or with an ESCo (they may even be the same 
company) or on consent. 
4. If allowed on one of these grounds the consumer 
must be provided with information about the fact that 
measures are taken based on automated profiling 
and they must be provided with information about the 
envisaged effects. This can be summarized as profile 
transparency. 
5. We can discriminate between back-end, front-end en 
interface transparency. 
 Proposals for data protection by design:
a. Profile transparency must be realised in the back-end 
system, rendering the lawfullness of the data mining 
operations auditable – while taking into account trade 
secrets and intellectual property rights.
b. Profile transparency must be realised by means 
of attractive interfaces that allow users to access 
information about the way they are profiled and 
how this may impact them.
c. Profile transparency must be realised in the front-
end of the system, inviting users to interact with 
their profiles, understanding how their energy 
usage behaviour is interpreted by the profiling 
technologies.
d. Another possibility is to put data in a personal data 
closet with an intelligent agent (inference machine) 
that mines own data and those of peers and thus:
a. what profiles a user matches. 
b. e.g. advices to withdraw consent and/or to 
order erasure.
2.1.13 Liability of data controllers and data processors 
(section 4.1.12)
1. In terms of the law the question is not whether a 
company or a public body designates itself as either 
a controller or a processor. This will be established on 
the basis of actual control and delegation.
2. Under the proposed Regulation fines of up to 1.000.000 
euro or 2% of the annual worldwide turnover are 
possible (competition law types of penalties). 
3. The liability of controllers and processors of personal 
data under the proposed GDPR will require the 
articulation of all mandatory rights and obligations of 
the data protection framework into the Smart Grid 
architecture.
4. Combined with 
a. the imposition of DPbDefault (data minimisation), 
b. DPbDesign (early uptake of all the relevant rules 
and principles in the architecture) 
c. the introduction of new rights such as data 
portability, and 
d. newly articulated rights such as the right to be 
forgotten and 
e. rights against unwarranted profiling  the imposition 
of liability will force the industry to innovate on the 
basis of a level playing field. 
5. Techniques, technologies, applications, hardware, 
code, software and protocols will be invented and/or 
reinvented to make data protection part and parcel of 
the business model of advanced smart environments. 
6. The development of the Smart Grid will benefit from 
early investment into security and privacy by design, 
preventing rising costs of ICT maintenance and 
preventing dangerous fluctuations in consumer trust. 
Those who fail to comply will be out of business.
2.1.7 Legal requirements for consumer-driven added 
value services (section 4.1.5)
1. In an environment where unexpected patterns may 
incentivize new business models and create unforeseen 
added value, data minimisation could stifle innovation.
 Proposals for Data Protection by Design:
a. One solution for this problem would be to engage 
users, allowing their participation – based on 
enhanced transparency, open source software and 
intuitive interfaces that show what is done with their 
data and how matching profiles might impact them. 
b. This will turn energy prosumers into data and 
profile prosumers, taking serious their participation 
in the creation of added value. 
c. Profile-transparency, the right to forget and data 
portability are preconditional for such participation.
d. Taken together this will amount to a user centric 
personal data ecosystem approach.
2.1.8 Legal requirements in relation to sensitive data 
and non-discrimination (section 4.1.6)
1. Profiling enables ‘masking’ [prohibited discrimination 
on the basis of trivial – non-sensitive – data that 
correlate with sensitive data]. 
 Proposals for Data Protection by Design:
a. To protect against masking discrimination-aware 
data mining may be required.
b. Alternatively, an intelligent agent may be developed 
that can inference such correlations, and check via 
feedback loops and P2P communications with 
other agents whether such discrimination is indeed 
at stake.
2.1.9 Legal requirements of consent (section 4.1.7)
1. Under the proposed GDPR the burden of proof that 
consent has been given is with the controller, and 
consent can be withdrawn any time. 
2. A person should only give consent for the application 
of profiles if she is provided with the required 
transparency.
 Proposals for Data Protection by Design:
a. All services for which consent is required should be 
switched off by default. 
b. The consent switch should be granular enough to 
invite deliberate decisions but not overestimate the 
attention span of individual users:
- the switch must be easy to use for withdrawal 
of consent; 
- on the basis of metadata built-in alarm 
signals should notify users of data and policy 
breaches and easy to understand notifications 
of changes in relevant policies or protocols, 
allowing for smart usage of the switch; 
- different switches could be designed for data 
used to construct profiles and those used to 
match a person with existing profiles. 
2.1.10 Legal requirement of the right to be forgotten 
(section 4.1.8.1)
1. The proposed Regulation requires mechanisms to have 
personal data erased, this means that the architecture 
should entail DPbDefault: automated deletion as soon 
as data minimisation requires it.
2. The proposed Regulation requires mechanisms to 
facilitate easy access of data subjects to their data, 
and easy implementation of their right to have data 
deleted in case of withdrawal of consent or unlawful 
processing.
3. The proposed Regulation requires mechanisms to 
erase data after having provided them in function of 
data portability.
4. The term ‘mechanism’ is not defined in the Regulation 
but should be understood in a broad sense, it seems 
to refer to a mix of automated or semi-automated 
procedures, protocols, standards, certifications, 
software tools that generate a default setting for 
specific operations. 
 Proposals for data protection by design and default
a. In the case of the right to be forgotten, mechanisms 
should enable sophisticated, flexible consent 
management, e.g. by means of visualisation 
techniques, or sticky policies (with time stamps) 
combined with theorem provers.
b. The to-be-deleted data that reside with third parties 
must be targeted to make the right effective, 
implying the use of e.g. the Semantic Web to 
chase one’s data across the web.  
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for local energy markets with flexible pricing strategies and 
local demand-response.
2.2.2 Personal Data Vaults or similar solutions 
The idea would be to keep energy usage data in a personal 
data vault with strict protocols that determine who gets 
to access what data for how long, for what purpose, to 
be shared with what other entity etc. This should also 
provide accurate data on who accessed what data for 
what purpose on what legal ground etc. The vaults can 
be kept on the hardware of the user or with the provider 
of the virtual vaults (centralized or distributed);13 these are 
important choices, relating to security and privacy issues. 
Profiling can still be done, but in some systems it seems 
that cross-contextual profiling and aggregate profiling is 
no longer possible. This depends on architectural choices. 
Google autocomplete (and page rank) would work very 
differently if based only on the data of one’s own previous 
searches. 
This type of solution could provide compliance with data 
minimisation and could empower users as data & data 
derivative prosumers, depending on the functionality of 
the protocols that hold the system together.14 It can be 
integrated with the other solutions. 
2.2.3 Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) 
and aggregation techniques to achieve 
anonymisation
In relation to data mining and profiling software has been 
developed that enables analytics with a minimal or no 
disclosure of personal data, called privacy preserving 
data mining (PPDM).15 This could be implemented on the 
side of network operators, energy suppliers as well as 
energy service companies whenever they need to perform 
analytics on data aggregates. This way data minimisation 
can be accomplished, while various types of profiling are 
made possible.16 
2.2.4 Management of credentials instead of 
identification
This concerns authentication and authorisation based on 
attributes or credentials instead of full identification.17 This is 
a straightforward application of data minimisation. Profiling 
becomes a different thing or impossible, depending on 
whether and what data are linkable. 
For the Smart Grid this could be interesting whenever 
the sharing of energy usage data does not involve billing 
or energy supply to a particular household. A consumer 
could for instance provide information on thresholds of 
electricity usage per week without this being linked to a 
name, address or other identifier, nor to other behavioural 
data of the same household. 
2.2.5 Metadata, semantic web and agreement 
technologies
Use of metadata to describe the data:18 e.g. type of data; 
ground for processing; allowed purpose of processing per 
controller; consent for which purpose for which controller/
processor; allowed recipients of the data; time stamps 
for release, processing operations, erasure; linkability; 
anonymisation etc. This is a rather elaborate way of 
implementing data minimisation. 
Use of metadata to implement data protection policies: 
e.g. a prohibition to process data, unless certain conditions 
are met; an obligation to anonymise or erase after a 
specific time-slot or under specific conditions; permission 
to process data for specific parties etc. This may allow 
for a granulor type of control, especially if integrated with 
intelligent agents on the side of the user. 
Making the concept of agreement operational for systems 
of computational agents, allowing artificial agents on the 
side of the consumer to communicate and interact on 
a machine-to-machine basis with agents on the side of 
suppliers, network operators, local suppliers (neighbours), 
ESCos, acting on behalf of the consumer.19 The goal would 
be to detect and address violations of data protection 
legislaton, and to implement a consumer’s expressed or 
inferred privacy preferences.
If such systems work, they would enable much more than 
just data minimisation. This would enable consumers to 
become data prosumers in their own right, depending on 
the transparency of the back-end of the system.  
2.2.6 Discrimination Aware Data Mining (DADM)
With regard to profiling and the implications of an 
outcome that induces prohibited (indirect) discrimination 
the techniques of discrimination aware data mining are 
important (DADM); these techniques provide transparency 
about bias within the data mining operations that fall within 
the scope of prohibited discrimination.20  
DADM can provide a measure of back-end transparency 
on how people are being profiled. 
2.1.14 Cookie legislation and data retention 
obligations (section 4.2)
1. If energy usage behaviour data are transmitted by 
means of a publicly available communication service 
or network: 
a. tracking mechanisms such as cookies require 
informed prior consent;
b. traffic data must be retained in accordance with the 
national law that implements the Data Retention 
Directive; such data must be accessible for law 
enforcement under strict conditions in specific cases.
2.1.15 Police and Criminal Justice (section 4.3)
1. Smart grid operators should foresee that, especially 
in the context of fraud detection or tax evasion, law 
enforcement may seek ways to access energy usage 
data. This may concern either the usage data of a 
specific person, who is already under suspicion or Big 
Data that allow to create data derivatives deemed to 
aid criminal intelligence. 
2. To the extent possible the architecture should prevent 
and rule out easy access to large amounts of energy 
usage data as this would be contrary to the principle 
of purpose binding. In individual cases and under 
strict legal conditions access should be enabled and 
it would help if the architecture has a default setting 
against easy access.
3. This is especially urgent for either specific personal 
data or Big Data collected by third parties who may 
be tempted to provide such specific or aggregated, 
anonymised data on a voluntory basis. Though this 
would obviously violate the legal requirements of 
data minimisation (purpose limitation, prohibition of 
secondary use without explicit consent), it may be 
difficult to audit such violations after the data have 
been anonymised.
2.1.16 Cloud Computing (section 4.4)
1. Smart Grid operations that concern critical 
infrastructure should not be managed in public clouds 
for reason of energy availability, grid resilience and 
other security, privacy and data protection concerns.
2. Smart Grid applications that concern added value 
services should not be run in public clouds because of 
increased data protection risks.
3. To the extent that private clouds could provide benefits 
in terms of security, privacy and data protection, 
decisions on their employment and the relevant 
conditions should be part of the DPIA.
2.2 Typology of potential technical solutions 
In this section the technical articulation of proposals for legal 
protection by design are categorised: (1) separation of data 
streams, end-2-end encryption and secure authentication 
(2) data vaults, (3) privacy preserving data mining & 
aggregation techniques, (4) credentials management 
instead of identification, (5) metadata, semantic web & 
agreement technologies, (6) discrimination aware data 
mining, (7) user centric personal data eco system. 
Some of these potential solutions address privacy and 
security in the sense of confidentiality and access control, 
some articulate data minimisation, others provide tools that 
should empower energy consumers to play around with 
their data and become a partner in the business model 
of value added services. Though we can expect that the 
types of solutions can and will be combined, this is not 
always possible. Choices will have to be made, taking into 
account that some solutions are path-dependent, making 
it more difficult to opt for other solutions at a later point in 
time. The famous Dutch proverb stating that sometimes 
we must spend a dime to earn a pound is relevant here: 
architecture is politics and wise anticipation can prevent a 
host of foreseeable problems.
2.2.1 Separation of data streams, end-2-end 
encryption and secure authentication
The most simple solutions to some of the problems that 
can be foreseen when massive amounts of energy usage 
data are processed are: (1) to separate the datastreams 
that nourish the critical infrastructure from those that 
nourish advertising, marketing and law enforcement; 
(2) end-2-end encryption wherever data are transferred 
between devices, meters, network operators, suppliers 
and ESCos and (3) secure authentication to control 
access to the data. The first concerns the articulation of 
the purpose limitation into the architecture of the Smart 
Grid, the second concerns the confidentiality of energy 
usage data en the third concerns control over the access 
to the same data. 
One caveat may be that separating data streams may 
lead to sound protection for the critical infrastructure but 
unintentionally allow sloppy protection for privacy and 
data protection. It is important to emphasize that data 
processing on the basis of a contract or consent still 
requires compliance with e.g. purpose limitation. Another 
caveat concerns the question of how separation of data 
streams relates to local, distributed data streams that allow 
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This chapter aims to provide an overview of the current 
state of affairs from the legal perspective.22 The focus will 
be on the implications of the profiling technologies that 
render the Grid a Smart Grid. 
3.1 Objectives
3.1.1 Right of universal service
The EU legal framework for the generation, supply and 
distribution of energy is based on the concept of services 
of general economic interest (SGEI),23 which obliges the 
Union and the Member States (MSs) to take care of ‘a high 
level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment and 
the promotion of universal access and of user rights’. 24 
This regards universal access to public services, even if 
they are provided by commercial enterprises. Sauter finds 
that ‘the clearest functional definition of universal service is 
perhaps the following one:25
It establishes the right of everyone to access certain 
services considered as essential and imposes obligations 
on service providers to offer defined services according to 
specified conditions including complete territorial coverage 
and at an affordable price.’
Directive 2009/72/EC for the electricity market (see 3.1.4) 
opens with a universal service provision in art. 3.3:
Member States shall ensure that all household 
customers,and, where Member States deem it 
appropriate, small enterprises (namely enterprises with 
fewer than 50 occupied persons and anannual turnover 
or balance sheet not exceeding EUR 10 million), enjoy 
universal service, that is the right to be supplied with 
electricity of a specified quality within their territory at 
reasonable, easily and clearly comparable, transparent 
and non-discriminatory prices. To ensure the provision of 
universal service, Member States may appoint a supplier 
of last resort. MemberStates shall impose on distribution 
companies an obligation to connect customers to 
their network under terms, conditions andtariffs set in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 37(6). 
Nothing in this Directive shall prevent MemberStates 
from strengthening the market position of the household, 
small and medium-sized consumers by promoting the 
possibilities of voluntary aggregation of representation for 
that class of consumers.
Directive 2009/73/EC for the gas market (see 3.1.4) 
has a similar obligation in 3.2. In both cases this is 
complemented with a special protection for vulnerable 
customers, including a prohibition of disconnection in 
critical times. 
3.1.2 Energy end-use efficiency
Directive 2006/32/EC, on energy end-use efficiency and 
energy services, introduces the need for improved energy 
end-use efficiency, the management of energy demand, 
the promotion of the production of renewable energy, 
reduction of CO
2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, 
stronger incentives for demand side energy services. 
To achieve such goals the Directive will be ‘providing 
indicative targets as well as mechanisms, incentives and 
institutional, financial and legal frameworks to remove 
existing market barriers (…)’ and ‘creating the conditions 
for the development and promotion of a market for energy 
services and for the delivery of other energy efficiency 
improvement measures to final consumers’ (art. 1). This 
directive imposed the obligation on MSs to provide smart 
meters, I will return to this point below (section 3.2).
3 Eu legal framework for  
the Energy Market
2.2.7 User Centric Personal Data Ecosystem
Obviously all these solutions have drawbacks, often 
involving new data protection risks (both privacy, 
discrimination and security risks). It is clear that a more 
holistic approach is needed, especially with regard to 
profiling, enabling new business models that do no thrive 
on secrecy and manipulation. Actively engaging end-users 
by providing three types of transparency seems pertinent:
1. Back-end system transparency: who is processing 
what data where, how, when and sharing with whom; 
what knowledge is inferred how, shared with whom on 
what conditions; how could such knowledge impact 
a person. This is about auditability of automated 
processing and decision systems. 
2. Front-end system transparency: how can a person 
interact with the back-end system without falling 
prey to unwarrented manipulation; how can a person 
figure out what interactions can safely and securely 
be delegated to artificial agent technologies; how can 
a person ensure that potential risks of energy usage 
behaviours are correctly anticipated by client-side 
profiling technologies (inference machines) that e.g. 
integrate crowd sourcing.
3. Interface transparency: how can information overload 
be prevented; how can manipulation be prevented; 
how can visual analytics and the use of icons be 
employed to generate intuitive interfacing between 
front-end and back-end of the Smart Grid. 
Such threefold transparency can help to empower final 
consumers to become partners in processes of data 
analytics, taking a more central role within the personal 
data ecosystem.21
2.3 General recommendations
 1. Think in terms of data flows instead of isolated 
discrete data; foresee whether de-anonymisation will 
reinstate identifiability and treat data streams that are 
susceptible to such de-anonymisation as falling within 
the scope of data protection legislation.
 2. Make privacy and security an essential part of your 
business-model, do not treat them as costs but as a 
competitive advantage – especially in the long run.
 3. Start from and reiterate Data Protection Impact 
Assessments.
 4. Practice Data Protection by Design and by Default.
 5. Develop software tools and hardware infrastructure 
that is innovative in terms of DPbDesign and by Default.
 6. Develop business models based on DPbDesign and 
by Default.
 7. Practice Security by Design, notably end-to-end 
encryption and secure authentication wherever 
possible.
 8. Invest in recurrent software analyses.
 9. Practice discrimination-aware data mining.
10. Base your trust management on trustworthiness.
11. Never underestimate the recurrent cost of safety and 
security.
12. Don’t allow critical infrastructure to depend on volatile 
markets.
13. Create separate data streams for (1) critical 
infrastructure that protects the right to universal 
service, and (2) commercial value added services.
14. Design profile transparency in the back-end of the 
Smart Grid system.
15. Design intuitive interfaces that provide transparency 
about the potential consequences of sharing one’s 
data (showing what profiles they match).
16. Design for profile transparency in the front-end of the 
Smart Grid system (allow consumers to play around 
with their data to figure out how they are matched).
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protection, in art. 3.2 (both Directives), and requires 
MSs to promote energy efficiency by means of e.g. the 
introduction of smart metering systems or smart grids. 
In the Annex the Directives require MSs to introduce smart 
meters and, if – after conducting a cost benefit analysis - 
they are cost effective, to have a rollout by 2022 covering 
80% of end-users.
3.1.5 Summary
Based on the EU legislative framework we can define the 
following objectives for the internal EU energy market:
 Universal access to affordable energy for end-users 
 Reliability and availability of energy
 Improved energy end-use efficiency (energy savings)
 Demand-response, based on adequate pricing 
strategies
 Generation of renewable energy resources, with a 
targeted outcome in 2020
 Reduction of CO2
 Removal of existing market barriers (unbundling)
 Flexible pricing strategies
 Correct information for end-users regarding their 
energy usage and pricing
 Transparency for end-users about the share of 
renewable energy in their energy consumption
3.2 Smart Meter
The Measuring Instruments Directive 2004/22/EC 
observes in Recital 2 that:
Correct and traceable measuring instruments can be used 
for a variety of measurement tasks. Those responding 
to reasons of public interest, public health, safety and 
order, protection of the environment and the consumer, 
of levying taxes and duties and of fair trading, which 
directly and indirectly affect the daily life of citizens in many 
ways, may require the use of legally controlled measuring 
instruments.
This implies that smart meters must be ‘legally controlled’, 
in the sense of meeting legal requirements in terms of 
durability, accuracy, suitablity etc. This may, for instance, 
have consequences for the mandatory data retention 
capacities of smart meters. In Annex MI-003 (active 
electricity meters) the Directive stipulates under 5.3 that:
In the event of loss of electricity in the circuit, the amounts 
of electrical energy measured shall remain available for 
reading during a period of at least 4 months.
 Art. 13.1 of Directive 2006/32/EC [and art. 9.1 of Directive 
2012/27/EU] determines that:
MSs shall ensure that, in so far as it is technically possible, 
financially reasonable and proportionate in relation to the 
potential energy savings, final customers for electricity, 
natural gas, district heating and/or cooling and domestic 
hot water are provided with competitively priced individual 
meters that accurately reflect the final customer’s actual 
energy consumption and that provide information on 
actual time of use.
The idea is that whenever existing meters are replaced, 
smart meters will be provided (also in the case of new or 
renovated buildings).30 MSs must ensure that these meters 
enable billing based on actual energy consumption, 
while the following information must be provided to final 
customers: 
a. current actual prices, actual consumption, 
b. comparisons of current consumption with that of one 
year ago, 
c. comparisons with average normalised or benchmarked 
usage, 
d. contact information for consumers’ organisations and 
similar bodies that can provide information on energy 
efficiency improvement measures. 
The Art. 29 Working Party on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
(Art. 29 WP) has written an Opinion (12/2011, WP 183) on 
Smart Metering in 2011. They note that Data Protection 
Supervisors responding to a questionnaire observed that 
‘the level of security needs to be comparable with other vast 
operation such as Internet banking’ (idem: 2). They also 
note that without sufficient data protection ‘there is a risk 
not only that processing of personal data will be in breach 
of national laws which implement Directive 95/46EC but 
also that consumers will reject these programmes on the 
basis that the collection of personal data is unacceptable 
to them’ (at 3). The Art. 29 WP emphasizes that smart 
meters are ‘a pre-requisite for the smart grid’ (at 6). 
On 25th October 2012 Directive 2012/27/EU has been 
enacted, which will replace (amongst others) the current 
Directive 2006/32/EC. MSs have until 5th June 2014 to 
implement this Directive into national law. This Directive 
sets as a target the saving of 20% of the Union’s primary 
energy consumption by 2020 compared to projections 
(art.1). This is part of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the 
flagship resource-efficient Europe. This Directive repeats 
the obligation on MSs to provide smart meters, see below 
in section 3.2. 
The 2012/27/EU Directive aims to strenghten and 
increase policies for energy efficiency, notably integrating 
cogeneration of heat and power, (repealing Directive 
2004/8/EC that now addressed this issue),26 reinforcing 
measures to empower of final customers by providing 
access to actual energy consumption (smart metering, art. 
9; energy audits and energy management systems, art. 8, 
including transparency about high-efficiency cogeneration; 
a consumer information and empowering programme, art. 
12), and stepping up measures to facilitate and promote 
demand response (for instance by means of flexible pricing 
or automation). It sets exemplary targets for public bodies’ 
buildings and for purchasing by public bodies and requires 
MSs to develop energy efficiency obligation schemes 
(art. 7). Theses energy efficiency obligation schemes e.g. 
entail ‘new savings each year from 1 January 2014 to 
31 December 2020 of 1.5% of the annual energy sales 
to final customers of all energy distributors or all retail 
energy sales companies by volume, averaged over the 
most recent three-year periode prior to 1 January 2013’ 
(art.7.1). The Directive devotes specific attention to energy 
services (art. 18) by requiring MSs to promote the energy 
services market that should contribute to energy savings 
(e.g. by means of financial instruments, incentives, grants 
and loans; quality labels; certifications; model contracts; 
qualitative review).
3.1.3 Use of energy from renewable sources
Directive 2009/28, on the use of energy from renewable 
resources,27 aims to contribute to compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol, reducing dependence on imported oil, as 
well as promoting security of energy supply, technological 
development and innovation. Special attention goes to 
the energy market for the transport sector. A 20% share 
of energy from renewable sources and a 10% share for 
transport are set to be achieved by a just distribution of 
mandatory national targets by 2020.28 A guarantee of 
origin is stipulated and regulated to achieve transparency 
and accountability.29 The Directive also lays down rules for 
access to the electricity grid for energy from renewable 
sources: art. 16 stipulates that ‘MSs shall take the 
appropriate steps to develop transmission and distribution 
grid infrastructure, intelligent networks, storage facilities 
and the electricity system, in order to allow the secure 
operation of the electricity system as it accommodates 
the further development of electricity production from 
renewable energy sources, including interconnection 
between MSs and between MSs and third countries. MSs 
shall also take appropriate steps to accelerate authorisation 
procedures for grid infrastructure and to coordinate 
approval of grid infrastructure with administrative and 
planning procedures’. The Directive requires reliability 
and safety of the grid, ‘based on transparent and non-
discriminatory criteria defined by the competent national 
authorities’ [art. 16(2)]. MSs must ‘assess the necessity 
to build new infrastructure for district heating and cooling 
produced from renewable energy sources in order to 
achieve the 2020 national target (…). Subject to that 
assessment, MSs shall, where relevant, take steps with 
a view to developing a district heating infrastructure to 
accommodate the development of heating and cooling 
production from large biomass, solar and geothermal 
facilities’ [art. 16(11)].
Note that the Directive requires ‘intelligent networks’, 
but hardly refers to the input of consumer-generated 
renewable energy into the grid. 
3.1.4 Reform and common rules for the internal 
energy market
Directive 2009/72/EC, and Directive 2009/73, concerning 
common rules for the internal market for electricity 
(2009/72) and natural gas (2009/73) introduce a novel 
framework for the internal market in electricity with the aim 
of creating new business opportunities, more cross-border 
trade, efficiency gains, competitive prices and higher 
standards of service, while contributing to security of 
supply and sustainability (recital 1 of both Directives). The 
idea has been to create a level playing field for all electricity 
undertakings in the EC. One of the instruments to achieve 
this is a fully effective separation of network activities from 
those of the supply and generation of energy, hoping to 
remove incentives for vertically integrated undertakings. 
Next to this the Directive states that MSs may impose 
public service obligations with regard to security of supply, 
quality, pricing and environmental protection, energy 
efficiency, energy from renewable sources and climate 
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especially for customer applications, as regulators, utilities 
and third-party service providers define their roles and 
set technology standards. Many core systems remain 
unproven and currently a limited number of Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) systems have been deployed 
in Europe.’38 This is a sobering introduction to a detailed 
recommendation with regard to Data Handling, Data 
Safety and Consumer Protection. It highlights that cost-
benefit analyses contain many uncertainties and require 
perhaps a precautionary approach to achieve robust 
knowledge of risks and opportunities. 
Directive 2009/72/EU encourages MSs to deploy smart 
metering system (art. 3 of the Directive) ‘that shall assist 
the active participation of consumers in the electricity 
supply market’ (art. 2 of the Annex). ‘The implementation:
May be subject to an economic assessment of all the 
long-term costs and benefits to the market and the 
individual consumer or which form of intelligent metering 
is economically reasonable and cost-effective and which 
timeframe is feasible for their distribution. (…) Such 
assessment shall take place by 3 September 2012’ (art. 
2 of the Annex). 
If the assessment is positive, ‘at least 80% of consumers 
shall be equipped with intelligent metering systems by 
2020’ (art. 2 of the Annex). The Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) of the European Commission has recently published 
Guidelines for Cost Benefit Analysis of Smart Metering 
Deployment,39 advising on both quantitative and qualitative 
assessment and their combination. In the Netherlands 
three Cost Benefit Analysis have been prepared, starting 
with the KEMA report of 2005, followed by a revised 
financial analysis and policy advice by KEMA in 2010, 
complemented with the Social Cost Benefit Analysis of CE 
Delft and DNV KEMA in 2012.40 
Interestingly, the JRC has also written Guidelines for 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis of Smart Grid projects. 
This is linked to the EC Recommendation on smart 
metering 2012/148/EU, which reads:
Recital 16: (…) the Commission considers it important to 
lay down criteria, a template and more general guidelines 
that would improve the depth and comparability of 
analyses. As suggested by the Smart Grid Task Force, the 
criteria should use quantifiable indicators.
The Recommendation stipulates in art. 31 that the 
economic assessment should always include the following 
four steps: tailoring to local conditions, CBA, sensitivity 
analysis, performance assessment, externalities and 
social impact. The Guidelines for the CBA on Smart 
Grids also elaborate the proposal for a Regulation on 
guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructures, 
which provides a framework that should ‘overhaul the 
existing Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) 
policy and financing framework’.41 This Regulation will set 
rules to identify projects of common interest (PCIs) within 
a set of 12 strategic trans-European energy infrastructure 
corridors and areas; the Regulation will also provide 
a methodology and a process for the elaboration of a 
harmonised energy system-wide cost-benefit analysis for 
PCIs in electricity and gas. The proposal explicitly refers to 
smart grids as one of the priority thematic areas: ‘adoption 
of smart grid technologies across the Union to efficiently 
integrate the behaviour and actions of all users connected 
to the electricity network, in particular the generation of 
large amounts of electricity from renewable or distributed 
energy sources and demand response by consumers’.42 
In its Guidelines the JRC follows the CBA model of the 
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI), as used in a 
report commissioned by the US Department of Energy. 
In response to the EC Recommendation on smart 
metering the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
points out that the Data Protection Impact Assessment 
(DPIA) recommended by the Commission should be a part 
of the CBA.43 
In this study I will not assess, evaluate or even discuss the 
intricacies of the CBA. However, we must acknowledge 
three points in relation to a calculation of costs and benefits. 
First, as Andy Stirling has demonstrated,44 the factors 
used to calculate either costs or benefits generally entail 
four types of incertitude: risks, uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
ignorance. As Stirling has demonstrated, risk analysis 
only pertains when there is certain knowledge about the 
probabilities of a factor’s occurence and about the types 
of effects of that factor. This certainty allows precise 
calculation of costs and benefits. However, usually the 
incertitude refers to what Stirling defines as uncertainty 
(the knowledge about probability is not certain even 
though knowledge about the type of effects is certain); 
ambiguity (knowledge about probability is certain but 
there is no agreement about the effects, for instance 
about whether they are positive or negative); or ignorance 
The European Commission (EC) has issued a 
Recommendation on the rollout of smart metering 
systems (2012/148/EU) on 9th March 2012,31 to which 
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has 
responded with an Opinion (EDPS/12/10) on 11th June 
2012. The Commission states:
Recital 10: Data protection and information security 
features should be built into smart metering systems 
before they are rolled out and used extensively. Such 
features can effectively improve consumers’ control over 
the processing of personal data.
To achieve such Data Protection by Design:
Recital 9: (…) data protection impact assessments should 
make it possible to identify from the start data protection 
risks in smart grid developments.
Recital (14) A template developed at Union level for 
conducting data protection impact assessments will 
ensure that the provisions of this Recommendation are 
followed coherently across MSs
The EC defines the smart metering system (art. 3(b) of its 
Recommendation 2012/148/EU):
Art. 3(b) ‘smart metering system’ means an electronic 
system that can measure energy consumption, adding 
more information than a conventional meter, and can 
transmit and receive data using a form of electronic 
communication’.
The EC details its recommendation with regard to the 
Data Protection Impact Assessment, advocating 
Data Protection by Design and by Default. The EDPS 
has commented extensively on the Commission 
Recommendation. This will be further discussed under the 
heading of the European legal framework (section 3a.10).
Most important for this study is to acknowledge that 
while the Smart Metering System is pre-conditional 
for the rollout of the Smart Grid, the Smart Grid entails 
a more comprehensive system of energy generation, 
transport and distribution, introducing demand-response, 
flexible pricing and enabling added value services. One 
can image the provision of smart meters without further 
developing a Smart Grid, in which case the meter might 
reduce administrative costs due to its ability for remote 
reading and automated billing.32 In fact, the Dutch report 
on social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) of smart grids 
takes as its baseline the introduction of smart meters, 
followed up with active grid management and simplified 
control strategies.33 This baseline scenario does not fall 
within the scope of the Smart Grid, but is enabled by the 
smart meter. So we should acknowledge that the smart 
meter is pre-conditional for the Smart Grid, but does not 
automatically generate a Smart Grid and has cost and 
benefits independent from the actual implementation of 
the Smart Grid. 
3.3 Standardisation
Interoperability is a precondition for a unified internal 
energy market, requiring technical and organisational 
standardisation. The European Commission has therefor 
addressed 
 Mandate M/441 on smart meters (March 2009) to the 
European Standardization Organisations (ESOs): CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI. The idea is to develop standards 
for an open architecture for utility meters with 
communication protocols enabling interoperability.34 
The ESOs have established the Smart Metering 
Coordination Group (SM-CG), which functions as 
a joint advisory body that provides a focal point 
concerning M/441. In December 2011 they published 
a Technical Report.35 
 Mandate M/490 on Smart Grid deployment to the 
ESOs (March 2011), whose Joint Working Group 
published a Final report on Standards for Smart 
Grids in May 2011.36 Additional reporting has been 
done in 2012, providing first recommendations for 
the reference architecture, a first set of consistent 
standards, sustainable processes and investigate 
standards for information security and data privacy.37 
3.4 Cost Benefit Analysis
The Smart Grid Task Force Expert Group 2 on Smart 
Grids writes at the end of 2011: ‘The course of Smart 
Grid adoption in Europe is far from clear. The underlying 
technologies remain expensive; their business case 
relies on assumptions of significant changes in customer 
behaviour; and cost-effective integration of existing 
systems and emerging technologies is not yet proven. 
The business model in many cases is still emerging, 
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3.5 Margin of appreciation; latitude of MSs
Within the framework of European law, both the European 
Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxemburg and 
the European Court of Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe in Strassbourg reserve ‘a margin of appreciation’ 
for the MSs when interpreting EU legislation or the 
European Convention of Human Rights. This provides a 
measure of latitude for the MSs. Regarding EU Directives 
we can distinguish between minimum or complete 
harmonization. The first means that MSs adopt the 
minimum requirements of the Directive, but can add more 
stringent requirements. The second means that MSs adopt 
the precise requirements of the Directive without adding 
more stringent requirements, since this would obstruct 
the level playing field of the internal market. Also, in many 
cases MSs are allowed to add requirements or even to 
skip requirements if this is desirable from the perspective 
of environmental concerns. 
The EU framework on Smart Grids seems to leave some 
room for deviation based on the different traditions around 
Grids in the MSs. As we have seen above, CBAs are to be 
conducted by MSs and they can - in theory - lead to the 
conclusion that in that particular MS the introduction of 
smart metering systems is not beneficial. For example, In 
Flanders the role-out has been halted on the basis of a cost 
benefit analysis, though this will be repeated and presently 
a roll-out has been initated by Eandis and Infrax.50
Alternatively the conclusion can be that in that particular 
MS the introduction requires a specific type of rollout, 
with perhaps different requirements. For that reason the 
Netherlands was able to codify the right for individual end-
users to refuse a smart meter, in which case a ‘dumb’ 
meter must be provided without the capacity for remote 
reading. As mentioned above, the end-user can also 
request that the network operator does not perform 
remote reading, even if a smart meter is installed.51 Such 
consumer rights have not been stipulated in the Directives 
regarding smart metering. 
This confirms latitude for MSs regarding the introduction of 
the Smart Grid (since there will be no Smart Grid without 
a smart metering system): (1) deviation from the roll-out 
as promoted by the EU is possible on the basis of the 
outcome of the CBA and (2) on the basis of anticipated 
human rights violations.
(both the knowledge about the probability and that about 
the types of effects are incertain). In these three cases 
no precise calculations can be made. The complexity 
of introducing and developing a Smart Grid generates 
all types of incertitude. This indicates that a cost benefit 
analysis will depend on interpretation of the relevant factors 
and eventually requires political decision making. We 
must acknowledge that the quantification of incertitudes 
that refer to uncertainty, ambiguity or ignorance is either 
impossible or makes no sense.45 In fact modelling and 
quantification inevitably reduce complexities. By mistaking 
uncertainties, ambiguities and unknown unknowns to 
calculable risks one takes the risk that the related threats 
become invisible when seen from the perspective of the 
CBA. 
Second, from the perspective of behavioural economics 
Smart Meters that include a remote off switch present a 
major security risk. In the words of Ross Anderson and 
Shailendra Fuloria ‘Smart meters change the game. The 
combination of commands that will cause meters to 
interrupt the supply, of applets and software upgrades that 
run in the meters, and of cryptographic keys that are used 
to authenticate these commands and software changes, 
create a new strategic vulnerability, (…)’.46
Third, the incertitude regarding security risks is related 
to the simple fact that critical infrastructure that depends 
on a computational layer will always require continuous 
monitoring, subsequent and sometimes real-time updating 
and recurrent upgrading. The amount of data to be 
processed within the context of the Smart Grid, as foreseen 
by the European legal framework will most probably 
require massive storage and processing power, thereby 
adding to the cost side of the CBA. It seems likely that 
the kind of computing power needed for central storage 
and processing will only be available if cloud computing is 
employed.47 Considering the fact that ICT expertise is both 
scarce and expensive while cloud computing will increase 
the demand for such expertise, one can safely predict that 
the costs of making critical infrastructure dependent on a 
computational layer will definitely be very high. 
One way of keeping the risks of hacking, data breaches, 
system breakdown, interruption of availability and safety 
hazards as low as possible is to minimize the dependence 
on computational systems. In another paper Anderson and 
Fuloria draw important conclusions from this fact, while 
developing a first attempt towards a security-economics 
analysis:48
Smart meters should by default only send such 
information to the utility as is necessary for billing and 
for technical operations. Information sharing with other 
entities – including energy management companies and 
the government – should require the customer’s consent, 
or be done in accordance with the law. Laws requiring 
information sharing must be sufficiently narrowly targeted 
for the consumer to foresee their effects, and they must 
be proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.
Taking serious this advice from Anderson and Fuloria, 
I conclude that an economic analysis of the security 
dimensions of the Smart Meter results in the requirement 
of a clear separation between information necessary for 
billing & technical operations and all other information, 
taking into account that both concern personal data but 
the grounds for processing differ. Especially trading with 
data derivatives has inherent risks that should not burden 
the critical infrastructure.
An important question is whether these risks can be 
mitigated by supply demand matching in local grids of 
neighbourhood households, entailing distributed instead 
of central data storage, and employment of smart 
algorithms at the local level, thus disabling aggregate 
profiling and targeting by ESCos.49 It is not clear as yet 
how this relates to separation of data streams, notably 
those of the DNO, individual households, suppliers and 
ESCos, especially when taking into account that various 
parties may combine these roles.  
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It is important to note that the free flow of personal data 
is an independent goal of the directive; the idea is that 
data protection regimes must be harmonised to create a 
level playing field within the internal market of the EU. The 
proposed Regulation confirms these objectives.
4.1.2 Scope of application 
The DPD stipulates that it is applicable when ‘processing is 
carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment 
of the controller on the territory of the Member State’ and 
e.g. also if ‘the controller is not established on Community 
territory and, for purposes of processing personal data 
makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated 
on the territory of the said Member State, unless such 
equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the 
territory of the Community’.57 This already implies a broad 
scope of application.
Some find that ‘in practice, the Directive has by now 
become the international data protection metric against 
which data protection adequacy is measured’.58 This 
is similar to the so-called ‘California effect’ within the 
US jurisdiction: to the extent that environmental law or 
the regulation of cyberspace affects parties outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of California or the EU, they may decide 
to comply with the most stringent legislation to prevent 
the hassle of having to develop granular compliance, 
depending on the applicable law.59 Though there are limits 
to this effect, the proposed Regulation dares to grasp 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by stipulating that, besides being 
applicable to data processing by a controller or processor 
in the Union (art. 3 proposed Regulation):
 This Regulation applies to the processing of personal 
data of data subjects residing in the Union by a 
controller not established in the Union, where the 
processing activities are related to:
1. The offering of goods or services to such data subjects 
in the Union, or
2. The monitoring of their behaviour.
As Goldschmidt and Wu argue in their Who controls the 
Internet, the mere fact that foreign companies want to do 
business in Europe will allow Europe to regulate activities 
of such foreign enterprises to the extent that they indeed 
impact European citizens.60 
Design implications: 
1. The introduction of a General Data Protection 
Regulation with direct legal effect in all the Member 
States entails that for all companies operating in the 
EU it becomes profitable to develop standards that 
articulate default compliance with EU data protection 
rights and obligations, since the legal requirements will 
be uniform across the EU. 
4.1.3 Personal data
The current DPD is built around the processing of 
personal data. The definition of processing is very broad, 
including collection and storage in a database (even if not 
by automatic means). The definition of personal data is:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity [art. 2(a)].
Whether a natural person is identifiable depends on ‘all the 
means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller 
or by any other person to identify the said person’ [recital 
26].61 This criterion is casuistic, meaning that much will 
depend on the circumstances and e.g. the economic 
feasibility of using a data to uniquely identify a person.62 
Such economics will of course depend on the state of 
the art in technologies of de-anonymisation (costs) and 
on the incentive structure behind de-anonymisation. We 
may expect the costs for de-anonymisation to decrease 
due to the increasing availability of relevant techniques, 
increasing access to linkable data and commercial 
gain or governmental need for personal data.63 Profiling 
technologies allow to correlate different data points, further 
facilitating the re-identification of de-anonymized data. 
In practice, this implies that data such as IP addresses, 
location and mobility data, RFIDs, but also anonymized 
energy consumption data may at some point allow for 
identification, even if they are not initially linked to a unique 
person. For a company it does not make sense to assume 
that such data are not personal data, because the risk 
that they will at some point render a person identifiable 
increases steadily with their correlatability. The advent of 
Big Data analytics, value added services and governmental 
fraud detection profiling implies that even the aggregation 
of smart meter data will not rule out identification. 
 
This chapter aims to confront current and future ‘settings’ 
of the EU legal framework on privacy, data protection and 
other fundamental rights, notably non-discrimination and 
due process. The focus will be on the implications of the 
profiling technologies that render the Grid a Smart Grid. 
Design implications will be indicated. They – obviously 
– require further study between lawyers, engineers, 
designers and business leaders.
4.1 Data Protection Directive 95/46/ec and 
proposed Regulation
The EU Data Protection framework was built on the Fair 
Information Principles as outlined in the OECD Guidelines 
of 1980.52 The main legal instrument is the Data Protection 
Directive (DPD) of 1995 that requires MSs to implement 
its content into national law. This means that each MS 
has its own national Data Protection Act. Under the 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
Member States (MSs) will no longer have any latitude,53 
because the Regulation will have direct effect in all the 
MSs. For this reason I will discuss the main structure of 
the Directive, which returns in the upcoming Regulation 
and add subsequent changes, clarifications and additional 
requirements in the proposed Regulation.54 
The proposed GDPR, to which I will refer as ‘the 
proposed Regulation’ or as ‘the proposed GDPR’, has 
been presented by the European Commission on 25th 
January 2012, together with a proposed Directive for Data 
Protection in the realm of policing and criminal justice 
(see section 3c). At the moment of writing this study, the 
proposed Regulation is still under discussion with the 
European Parliament (EP) and with the MSs. It is expected 
that most of the stipulations of the proposed Regulation 
will be agreed upon in the course of 2013.55 Obviously 
part of the industry is lobbying against some of the new 
stipulations, notably against law enforcement, privacy by 
default, the right to be forgotten, stricter requirements 
of consent and data breach notifications. A lobbying 
document obtained via a Freedom of Information suit by 
the ‘Europe-v-Facebook’ NGO, written by Facebook to the 
Irish Data Protection Supervisor states in its introduction:56
The new legislative framework should focus on encouraging 
best practice by companies like Facebook rather than on 
setting out detailed technical rules that will not stand the 
test of time and may be frustrating and costly for both 
service providers and users.
At this moment it is not expected that a major overhaul 
of the Regulation will take place in the course of the 
deliberations by the European legislator. The Regulation 
will enter into force the twentieth day after its publication in 
the EU Official Journal and take effect two years after that 
date. This implies that from 2016 data processing within 
the context of the Smart Grid will most probably have to 
comply with the new Regulation. It is crucially important 
for all stakeholders to anticipate its content.
4.1.1 Objectives
The objective of the 1995 DPD is twofold:
a) The protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons, and in particular their right to 
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data
b) The free flow of personal data within the internal market 
of the EU 
4 Eu legal framework on 
fundamental rights relevant 
for the smart grid
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Design implications: 
1. In the context of the Smart Grid it would be advisable 
to separate data streams based on necessity 
(contract, legal obligation, vital interests of the user, 
public interest, legitimate interests of the controller) 
from those based on consent. 
2. Since consent can be withdrawn (see below), this does 
not provide for a stable data stream and fluctuating 
trust levels around value added service should 
not endanger the reliability of the Smart Grid or the 
availability of energy. 
4.1.4.2 Data minimisation 
Next to being based on a legitimate ground, data must 
also be processed fairly and lawfully.68 This entails four 
requirements: 
1. purpose specification; 
2. use limitation; 
3. accuracy and completeness; 
4. deletion or anonymisation as soon as the purpose is 
no longer relevant. 
These requirements are often summed up as data 
minimisation: only those data may be processed that 
are necessary to achieve the purpose of processing, 
which must be specified; they may not be used for other 
purposes without specific consent; they may not be used 
longer than necessary to achieve the purpose for which 
they were processed. The data controller, i.e. whichever 
person or organisation determines the purposes and 
means of processing [art. 2(d)], is responsible and liable 
for complying with these requirements [art. 6(2) and art. 
23]. Below I will discuss the roles of data controller and 
data processor, their liability, and the various obligations 
they must perform in the Smart Grid.
Design implications: 
1. Note should be taken that data streams based on 
consent or contract or any other legitimate ground must 
still comply with the conditions of data minimisation 
(i.e. purpose specification and use limitation, accuracy 
and completeness, and deletion or anonymisation as 
soon as the purpose is no longer relevant).
 Proposals for Data Protection by Design and by 
Default:
a. It may save trouble to provide metadata for each 
data with the ground on which its processing is 
based, code for the purpose of processing and for 
the type of recipient of the data. This could make it 
easier to comply with transparency and auditability 
obligations and could fit with software that allows 
end-users to access their data in a format that 
easily sorts different types of data in a handsome 
overview.  
b. To the extent that such metadata function as sticky 
policies that determine how they can be shared and 
used, they could implement data minimisation and 
fulfil the requirements of data minimisation. They 
could thus enable what the proposed Regulation 
means with ‘Data protection by default’. 
c. Special care should be taken to prevent that 
metadata generate more or more serious data 
protection vulnerabilities than they aim to solve.
d. Another option would be to put data in a personal 
data closet with an intelligent agent that checks, 
records, remembers, calculates which data are 
with whom/what on what grounds, for what 
purpose, and which types of third parties may 
assess them.
e. In the contexts of the Smart Grid DPbDefault entails 
very strict default settings for the data stream of 
the critical infrastructure itself, preferably hardwired 
into the architecture. 
f. At the same time it should provide similar – 
softwired - technical protection for data streams 
that nourish the applications of ESCos, requiring 
them to clarify on the basis of machine-to-machine 
communication what data they need for what 
purpose, providing transparency for any secondary 
use (such as selling the data or data derivatives). 
g. This could be combined with a software tool that 
allows only credentials for value-added services, 
e.g. integrated with a personal data vault, and an 
intelligent agent.
4.1.5 Data protection by default (DPbDefault) = Data 
minimisation by default
The requirements for fair and lawful processing are often 
summarized as requiring data minimization. This should 
be the default setting of the Smart Grid infrastructure.
The proposed Regulation stipulates in art. 23(2):
The controller shall implement mechanisms for ensuring 
that, by default, only those personal data are processed 
which are necessary for each specific purpose of the 
Attempts to avoid applicability of the DPD by means of 
de-anonymisation face three challenges: (1) to provide 
personalized energy services data must be contextualized, 
networked and enriched, which rules out anonymisation, 
(2) at the level of computing systems anonymity is not a 
categorical but a granular conception, depending not only 
on unobservability but also on unlinkability, and (3) whatever 
data is unobserved or unlinkable today may be correlated 
with other data tomorrow or ten years from now. 
In that sense any (anonymous) data can become personal 
data, depending on the circumstances, economic 
incentives and technical state of the art. This should be 
taken into account when designing the Smart Grid. For 
the same reason it is better to think in terms of data flows 
instead of considering separate data; precisely because 
individual data of specific data streams may be or may 
become personal data it makes sense to treat all data 
within such a stream as personal data.64 On top of that we 
must note that profiling techniques can infer sophisticated 
profiles from anonymous data. Though these profiles, 
patterns, association rules, correlations or nearest 
neighbours are not personal data, they become personal 
data once applied to an identifiable person. This relates to 
the right not to be subject to measures based on profiling 
and to the right to be informed of the existence of profiling 
and to be informed of the envisaged consequences of 
the processing involved in profiling. This will be discussed 
separately below. 
I therefore propose to understand anonymisation, 
aggregation and/or encryption as implementations of Data 
Protection by Default (data minimisation) instead of ways 
to avoid applicability of the DPD or the proposed GDPR. 
While this report was being prepared the LIBE draft report 
was released, presenting amendments to the proposed 
GDPR to be voted in the European Parliament (EP). The 
LIBE is the EP Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs. Though I will not discuss all suggested 
amendments, because it is unclear to what extent they 
will make it into legislation,65 I make an exception for a 
proposed amendment in the definition of data subject. The 
LIBE proposes to redefine the definition as follows:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person 
is one who can be identified or singled out, directly or 
indirectly, alone or in combination with associated 
data, in particular by reference to an identification number 
a unique identifier, location data, online identifier or to 
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social or gender 
identity or sexual orientation of that person;66
This is interesting in relation to energy usage behaviours 
because it would enlarge the scope of personal data to 
data that allow to re-recognize a person, e.g. based on 
linkability between different sets of data. 
Design implications: 
1. In the context of the Smart Grid all data streams that 
contain energy consumption behaviours should best 
be treated as personal data, even if data aggregation 
or other techniques for anonymisation have been 
implemented. 
2. This means that for all data streams a Data Protection 
Impact Assessment is needed (see below) and Data 
Protection by Design and by Default (see below) must 
be implemented. 
3. Note that in this view aggregation or anonymisation 
techniques can be viable implementations of 
DPbDefault, but do not render Data Protection 
legislation inapplicable.
4.1.4 Grounds and data minimisation: the conditions 
for lawful processing
This concerns two types of conditions: grounds for 
legitimate processing and rules on fair and lawful 
processing. 
4.1.4.1 Grounds for processing. 
Personal data may only be processed on one of six 
grounds (conditions):67 
1. unambiguous consent of the data subject;
2. necessity for the performance or conclusion of a 
contract;
3. necessity to comply with a legal obligation for the data 
controller; 
4. necessity for the protection of vital interests of the data 
subject; 
5. necessity for the performance of a task carried out in 
the public interest or the exercise of official authority;
6. necessity for the purposes of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller, unless such interests are 
overridden by the fundamental rights interests of the 
data subject. 
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based on sensitive data at all. It may, nevertheless create 
non-obvious and invisible types of discrimination which 
are unfair or otherwise undesirable. They may infringe 
upon the autonomy and identity construction of end-users 
of the Smart Grid and will be discussed separately under 
the heading of the ‘Rights against unwarranted profiling’. 
Design implications: 
1. Profiling enables ‘masking’ [prohibited discrimination 
on the basis of trivial – non-sensitive – data that 
correlate with sensitive data]. 
2. To protect against ‘masking’ discrimination-aware 
data mining can be integrated.
3. Alternatively, an intelligent agent may be developed 
that can inference such correlations, and check via 
feedback loops and P2P communications with other 




The Directive defines consent as ‘freely given specific and 
informed’ [art. 2(h)]. When the processing of personal data 
is based on consent, it must be given ‘unambiguously’ [art. 
7(a)], and if consent is used to legitimate the processing of 
sensitive data the data subject must give ‘explicit consent’ 
[art. 8(2)a].73
The proposed Regulation specifies four conditions under 
which consent must be given to have legal effect:74 
a. the burden of proof that consent has been given is with 
the controller
b. if consent is given in the context of a written declaration 
which also concerns other matter, it must be presented 
in a way that clearly distinguishes it from the other 
matter
c. consent can be withdrawn at any time
d. consent shall not have legal effect in the case of 
a significant imbalance between the positions of 
controller and data subject.
In the ePrivacy Directive – that contains the so-called 
cookie legislation – consent is required to track user 
behaviour by means of e.g. cookies.75 This requirement 
does not depend on whether or not it involves personal 
data. Prior and informed consent is always required for 
behavioural targeting. This will be further discussed below, 
under the heading of the ePrivacy Directive and the Data 
Retention Directive.
In the context of profiling consent should not be 
overestimated as a legitimation. First, profiling can be 
based on anonymized data and still have a major impact 
once profiles are applied. In fact, under the current 
Directive and the proposed Regulation the application of 
profiles requires consent; per default one has the right not 
to be subjected to measures based on profiling (see below 
under ‘measures based on profiling’). If profiles are applied, 
consent does not imply that the rules and principles for fair 
and lawful processing are no longer relevant. So, consent 
for being subjected to a measure based on profiling does 
not necessarily imply consent to process behavioural 
responses to such profiling (purpose limitation could be 
violated). 
Design implications: 
1. All services for which consent is required should be 
switched off by default. 
2. A person should only give consent for the application 
of profiles if she is provided with the required 
transparency.
3. The consent switch should be granular enough to 
invite deliberate decisions but not overestimate the 
attention span of individual users:
a. the switch must be easy to use for withdrawal of 
consent; 
b. on the basis of metadata built-in alarm signals 
should notify users of data and policy breaches 
and easy to understand notifications of changes 
in relevant policies or protocols, allowing for smart 
usage of the switch; 
c. different switches could be designed for data used 
to construct profiles and those used to match a 
person with existing profiles. 
4.1.8 Rights of the data subject
One could, of course, qualify the requirement of consent 
as a right to consent of the data subject. But this is not 
very helpful. Consent is a condition. Irrespective of whether 
consent or one of the other conditions for the legitimate 
processing of personal data is applicable, data subjects 
have a number of rights. 
Under the current Directive, end-consumers have a right 
to obtain from the network operator, their supplier: access 
to their data, information about their origin, the categories 
of data processed, the logic involved in any automated 
processing. These are generally called transparency 
rights. They also have a right to rectify, erase or block 
processing and are especially not collected or retained 
beyond the minimum necessary for those purposes, both 
in terms of the amount of the data and the time of their 
storage. In particular, those mechanisms shall ensure that 
by default personal data are not made accessible to an 
indefinite number of individuals.
The Regulation further states that the Commission will 
‘adopt delegated acts (…) for the purpose of specifying 
any further criteria and requirements (…)’ and sets out that 
‘the Commission may lay down technical standards for 
the requirements laid down in paragraph (…) and 2’ [art. 
23 (3) and (4)]. 
As mentioned above this translates the data minimisation 
principle into technical requirements, requiring devices 
and infrastructure that feed on data to always restrict 
themselves to data that are necessary for the purpose that 
is specified. So, whoever buys alcohol need not identify 
herself, but should merely provide proof of the claim that 
her age is over 18. 
The Recommendation by the European Commission 
on the rollout of smart metering, defines DPbDefault as 
requiring: ‘to implement mechanisms for ensuring that, 
by default, only those personal data are processed which 
are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing 
and are especially not collected or retained beyond the 
minimum necessary for those purposes, both in terms of 
the amount of the data and the time of their storage’ [art. 
3(e)]. The Recommendation further advices that ‘for the 
purposes of optimising transparency and the individual’s 
trust, MSs should encourage use of appropriate privacy 
certification mechanisms and data protection seals and 
marks, provided by independent parties’ [art. 15].
Design implications: 
1. In the contexts of the Smart Grid DPbDefault entails 
very strict default settings for the data stream of the 
critical infrastructure itself, preferably hardwired into 
the architecture. 
2. At the same time it should provide similar – softwired 
- technical protection for data streams that nourish 
the applications of ESCos, requiring them to clarify 
on the basis of machine-to-machine communication 
what data they need for what purpose, providing 
transparency for any secondary use (such as selling 
the data or data derivatives). 
3. This could be combined with a software tool that 
allows only attributes/credentials for value-added 
services, e.g. integrated with a personal data vault, in 
the intelligent agent.
Have our cakes and eat them too?
1. In an environment where unexpected patterns 
may incentivize new business models and create 
unforeseen added value, data minimisation could stifle 
innovation.69 
2. One solution for this problem would be to engage 
users, allowing their participation – based on enhanced 
transparency, open source software and intuitive 
interfaces that show what is done with their data and 
how matching profiles might impact them. 
3. This will turn energy prosumers into data and profile 
prosumers70, taking serious their participation in the 
creation of added value. 
4. Profile-transparency, the right to forget and data 
portability are preconditional for such participation. 
4.1.6 Sensitive data and discrimination
Sensitive data require a special regime, because their 
processing could allow for forbidden discrimination. D 
1995/46/EC prohibits ‘the processing of personal data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious 
or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life’ [art.8(1)]. 
The proposed Regulation adds criminal convictions 
or related security measures and genetic data to the 
category of sensitive data. Exceptions are possible in 
case of e.g. explicit informed consent, the vital interests 
of the data subject or specific legal obligations, but in 
principle processing on the basis of forbidden grounds of 
discrimination is not allowed. 
In the case of profiling this is a very important prohibition, 
because if one detects a trivial data or an inferred pattern 
that correlates with ethnic origin or religious affiliation, it 
may be possible to work around the prohibition. Energy 
consumption patterns may indicate prayer times or fasting 
periods, linking with e.g. an Islamic background. They 
could also correlate with sexual preferences or criminal 
detention, if linked with other data. This could result in 
violation of discrimination in the context of occupation or 
employment (Directive 2000/78/EC) or racial discrimination 
(Directive 2000/43/EC).71 
However, profiling notably enables refined price-
discrimination, which is not prohibited and need not be 
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virtues of forgetting in the virtual age.78 We must highlight 
the fact that values such as individual liberty require 
that individuals are not forever matched with their past 
behaviours. Reducing people to inferences from historical 
data could stifle the creativity triggered by effective 
privacy rights that allow people to reinvent themselves. 
Also, secondary use of behavioural data easily endorses 
unwarranted function creep that can only be mitigated 
if less data is available and people regain a measure of 
control over who ‘knows’ what about them on the basis of 
what data derivatives. 
The proposed Regulation uses the term erasure, which 
clarifies that data should not merely be archived. Questions, 
however, remain as to whether anonymisation, aggregation 
or hiding from search engines, qualify as erasure.79 
Design implications:
1. The proposed Regulation requires mechanisms to have 
personal data deleted; this means that the architecture 
should entail DPbDefault: automated deletion as soon 
as data minimisation requires it.
2. The proposed Regulation requires mechanisms to 
facilitate easy access of data subjects to their data, 
and easy implementation of their right to have data 
deleted in case of withdrawal of consent or unlawful 
processing.
3. The proposed Regulation requires mechanisms to 
delete data after having provided them in function of 
data portability.
4. The term ‘mechanism’ is not defined in the Regulation 
but should be understood in a broad sense, it seems 
to refer to a mix of automated or semi-automated 
procedures, protocols, standards, certifications, 
software tools that generate a default setting for 
specific operations. 
5. In the case of the right to be forgotten, mechanisms 
should enable sophisticated, flexible consent 
management, e.g. by means of visualisation 
techniques, or sticky policies (with time stamps) 
combined with theorem provers.80
6. The to-be-deleted data that reside with third parties 
must be targeted to make the right effective, implying 
the use of e.g. the Semantic Web to chase one’s data 
across the web.  
4.1.8.2 Data portability
The proposed Regulation stipulates that data subjects 
have the right to obtain from the controller a copy of 
personal data undergoing processing. This right depends 
on whether the data are processed by electronic means 
in a structured and commonly used format. The data 
should be provided in an electronic and structured format 
commonly used to allow further use by the data subject.
If the data has been provided by the data subject and 
processing is based on consent, the data subject has the 
right to transmit them to another automated processing 
system – without hindrance from the original controller 
from whom the data are withdrawn.
This right should make it easy for end-user to switch 
supplier or to switch from one ESCo to another, while 
bringing her historical data to the alternative provider 
of energy or energy services. The idea is that the end-
user should not be held hostage by a particular supplier 
or ESCo. Data portability could e.g. facilitate automated 
switching from one provider to another, which could be 
an enabler for flexible pricing strategies. I assume that 
‘personal data provided by the data subject on the basis 
of consent or contract’ would include energy usage data, 
and I assume that in connection with the right to be 
forgotten the energy supplier and/or the ESCo must delete 
the data it holds once the data have been made portable 
and transferred to the end-user. However, this will depend 
on whether other grounds for the processing of these data 
are available and valid (data may still be needed for billing, 
for instance). We must also realize that when switching 
supplier or ESCo, end-users may have no idea of how 
to handle portable data, meaning that data controllers 
will transfer the data directly from one supplier or ESCo 
to another. This may require extra security, to prevent one 
provider gaining access to the data of another provider. 
Alternatively 
Design implications:
1. Data portability means that a data subject can obtain 
her energy usage data from the Distribution Network 
Operator (DNO) and/or supplier, or from the ESCo that 
was processing them.
2. The data must be provided in an electronic and 
structured format, e.g. via a secure online environment, 
or on a disc, or the data could be transferred 
straightaway to the new supplier or ESCo, or even 
deposited in a personal data vault.
3. Since the DNO is the party that transfers relevant data 
to the suppliers or to the ESCo, it is not clear what 
data portability could mean in relation to the DNO. 
data if unlawful and they can require notification to third 
parties that hold data they have rectified, erased or 
blocked. These rights are sometimes called participation 
rights. End-users also have the right ‘not to be subject 
to a decision which produces legal effects concerning 
him or significantly affects him and which is based solely 
on automated processing of data intended to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his 
performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, 
etc’ [art. 15(1)]. Various exceptions apply, notably in the 
case of a contract or authorization by law; in both cases 
the exception is only valid if suitable measures have been 
taken to safeguard the legitimate interests of the end-
users. One could call these rights against unwarranted 
profiling.
The proposed Regulation entails basically the same set of 
transparency and participation rights, plus those against 
unwarranted profiling. However, some new rights have 
been added and some have been rearticulated. A right to 
data portability has been added and the right to erasure of 
one’s personal data has been reinforced as the right to be 
forgotten. Finally the rights in relation to measures based 
on profiling have been reinforced, including an important 
transparency right regarding the envisaged effects of 
profiling. These rights will be discussed separately below. 
Design implications under the current Directive:
 Transparency tools must be developed to provide 
end-users with easy to access to: 
- their data 
- information about their origin (where the data 
provided or automatically recorded)
- a simple overview of the categories of data 
processed 
- the logic involved in any automated processing.76
 These software tools should integrate participation 
functions that enable end-users to: 
- rectify 
- erase or 
- block data if unlawful and to 
- require notification to third parties that hold data 
they have rectified, erased or blocked.
 Tools must be developed and/or integrated that 
protect against unwarranted profiling:
- tools to disable unlawful profile matching
- tools to exercise privacy protection, non-
discrimination and due process rights in the case 
of decisions based on lawful profiling
4.1.8.1 The right to be forgotten
The proposed Regulation stipulates that a data subject has 
the right to obtain the erasure of her personal data, from 
the data controller, who must also abstain from further 
dissemination of such data, especially regarding data from 
when she was a child. This ‘right to be forgotten’ applies 
on one of four grounds: if the data are no longer necessary 
based on the purposes for which they were collected, 
lawful withdrawal of consent (if no other ground applies), 
lawful objection to the processing of her personal data and 
if processing is not in compliance with the Regulation for 
other reasons.77
1. If the controller had made the relevant data public, 
it must take all reasonable steps, including technical 
measures, to inform third parties that are processing 
such data that the data subject has requested erasure 
of any links to, or copy or replication of the data. If the 
controller has authorised a third party publication of 
personal data, the controller is deemed responsible for 
the publication. 
2. The controller shall carry out the erasure without 
delay, except in the case of five specified exceptions: 
freedom of expression; public interest in the area 
of public health; historical, statistical and scientific 
research; compliance with a legal obligation based on 
Union or MS laws; or in the cases that the controller 
must restrict the processing of personal data.
3. In four specified cases the controller must restrict 
instead of erase data: if the accuracy is contested; if 
the data are no longer needed for the original purpose 
but must be kept for the purpose of proof; if the 
processing is unlawful but the data subject requests 
for their use to be restricted instead of erased; if the 
data subject requests to transmit the data into another 
automated processing system (data portability). In 
these cases the Regulation specifies how the data may 
still be processed. If the controller lifts the restriction 
the data subject must be informed. 
4. Time limits for erasure or review of the need to continue 
storage shall be implemented by means of relevant 
mechanisms, by the data controller.
5. In the case of erasure the data shall not be otherwise 
processed by the controller.
The idea of a ‘right to be forgotten’ presents a strong 
metaphor. It reinforces the current ‘right to have one’s 
personal data erased’ whenever the conditions for lawful 
processing are exhausted. Books have been written on the 
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a. Info on the type of processing on which the 
measure is based;
b. Which attributes, behaviours, variables have been 
used;
c. What aggregate and/or personalized profiles have 
been applied;
d. Info on the envisaged effects on the end-user;
e. How is the end-user categorized in terms of e.g. 
billing, payments, future pricing, credit rating, 
health-risks, political affiliation, earning capacity? 
Design implications: 
1. Profile transparency must be realised in the back-end 
system, rendering the lawfullness of the data mining 
operations auditable – while taking into account trade 
secrets and intellectual property rights.
2. Profile transparency must be realised by means of 
attractive interfaces that allow users to access 
information about the way they are profiled and how 
this may impact them.
3. Profile transparency must be realised in the front-
end of the system, inviting users to interact with 
their profiles, understanding how their energy usage 
behaviour is interpreted by the profiling technologies.
4. Another possibility is to put data in a personal data 
closet with an intelligent agent (inference machine) that 
mines own data and those of peers and thus:
a. Inferences what profiles a user matches. 
b. E.g. advices to withdraw consent and/or to order 
erasure.
4.1.9 The roles of data controller and data processor 
Under the Directive, data controllers determine the 
purpose of processing, whereas data processors merely 
implement whatever the data controller decides. This was 
a nice division of tasks ‘in the old days’, but seems to 
be quite out of tune with present day realities. As some 
authors suggest, ‘rather than the 1970s perception of 
an identifiable and single-jurisdiction data controller, at 
best assisted by an equally identifiable data processor, 
nowadays the norm is for multiple, multitasking, “cloud-
residing” or “outsourced” processing actors, with complex 
task and liabilities partitioning among them’.82 
The Regulation does not change the labeling of data 
controller and data processor, but takes into account 
that the same organisational entities may perform 
different functions with regard to the same data. This has 
consequences for the distribution of responsibility of joint 
controllers (to be arranged between them, art. 24) and for 
the responsibility of the processor (that will be considered 
as a controller whenever it oversteps its mandate, art. 
26(4), turning it into a joint controller with the controller 
that mandated its original processing operations (art. 26(4) 
and 24). 
Furthermore the Regulation enhances auditing 
requirements for the controller and processing, 
demanding extensive documentation of the data 
processing operations (art. 28), to be made available to 
the supervisory authority on request. This only goes for 
companies employing more than 250 persons. At the 
same time the current framework of notifications to the 
supervisory authority will be abandoned (art. 18-19 of D 
1995/46/EC). 
The current procedure of prior checking of ‘processing 
operations likely to present specific risks’ (art. 20 D 
1995/46/EC) returns in art. 34 of the proposed Regulation, 
allowing a controller or processor to obtain prior 
authorisation, which should ensure compliance. In specific 
cases the supervisory authority must still be consulted (art. 
34(2). 
The Regulation also imposes the appointment of a data 
protection officer in the case of data processing by a 
public authority or an enterprise employing more than 250 
persons, or in the case that the monitoring of data subjects 
is the core business of the controller or processor. 
The European Task Force Expert Group 2 on smart 
grids distinguishes the following six actors: Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs), Distribution System Operators 
(DSOs), Energy Generators (e.g. micropower production, 
MPP), Energy Market Suppliers, Metering Operators, 
and Customers (industrial, building owners, residential 
customers). The art. 29 WP distinguishes 3 types of data 
controllers: Energy suppliers (market suppliers in terms 
of the Task Force), Network Operators (DSOs in terms of 
the Task Force) and Other parties (central transmission 
manager between meter and supplier; energy regulator 
that needs data for policy setting and research; third party 
service providers or ESCos). 
Depending on the role these entities fulfil within a 
particular MS, they will qualify as data controller of data 
processor. This depends on (1) whether they process 
personal data and (2) whether they determine the purpose 
Should we foresee a time when DNOs are in 
competition across MSs?
4. The system may be designed in a way that keeps the 
data in a personal data vault, giving the data subject 
control over who gets to access the data. In that case 
portability is not the issue, but the right to be forgotten 
by the previous supplier or ESCo remains pertinent.
4.1.8.3 Rights against unwarranted profiling
The Directive provides the right not to be subject to 
automated decisions that have a significant impact or 
legal effect (though exceptions apply). It also provides a 
transparency obligation for the data controller, formulated 
as the duty to provide the ‘logic of processing’ in case of 
– at least – such automated decisions. 
The proposed Regulation pays even more stringent 
attention to what it now coins as ‘measures based on 
profiling’. It states that natural persons have the right not 
to be subject to measures with legal effects concerning 
this natural person or measures that may significantly 
affect this natural person, when such measures are based 
solely on automated processing intended to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to this natural person 
or to analyse or predict in particular the natural person’s 
performance at work, economic situation, location, health, 
personal preferences, reliability or behaviour.81
The proposed Regulation formulates 3 exceptions: in 
the case of (1) contract (where a right to obtain human 
intervention may be required as an adequate safeguard), 
(2) Union law or MS law, or (3) in the case of consent (again 
only if the necessary safeguards are in place). 
The proposed Regulation also stipulates that in the case 
of such exceptions an evaluation of a person may not be 
based solely on sensitive data. This relates to the right to 
non-discrimination as discussed above. 
Finally, the proposed Regulation stipulates that in case 
automated decisions based on profiling are lawfully made, 
the controller must provide ‘information as to the existence 
of processing for a measure of the kind referred to in 
paragraph 1 and the envisaged effects of such processing 
on the data subject.’ Paragraph 1 concerns measures with 
legal effects concerning a natural person with significant 
effect or meant to evaluate personal aspects or to analyse 
or predict health, work, etc.
The implications for the Smart Grid of this set of legal 
rights and obligations are: 
1. Smart metering is based solely on automated 
processing. Within the context of the Smart Grid, 
smart metering will be used to analyse and predict 
a natural person’s behaviour, economic situation, 
reliability, location, personal preferences (think of fraud 
detection, default on payment, energy consumption 
behaviour, energy consumption preferences, needed 
for load balancing, flexible pricing)
2. Smart metering will be based on a contract with the 
supplier, the first exception that allows for measures 
based on profiling: 
a. The request for the contract will be ‘lodged by 
the data subject’ and – to the extent that she is 
provided with energy – the contract will be satisfied. 
b. In relation to energy services based on a contractual 
relationship the same may be valid, depending on 
what it means to ‘satisfy’ the contract on the side 
of the energy service providers. 
c. It is unclear why only when there is no contract 
‘measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
legitimate interests’ must be implemented and it is 
unclear why only when there is no contract there is 
a ‘right to obtain human intervention’.
3. Smart metering will be expressly authorized by a MS’s 
law, the second exception that allows for measures 
based on profiling. This legal basis may define the 
relationship with the DNO. This law must stipulate 
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
legitimate interests. 
4. Smart metering may be based on consent if it 
concerns energy services outside a contract. Consent 
is the third exception that enables measures based on 
profiling. Relevant are 
a. the burden of proof; 
b. the effective right to withdraw consent at any 
time [this may be an advantage compared to a 
contractual relationship];
c. a potentially significant imbalance;
d. the provision of suitable safeguards [e.g. the 
right to human intervention as a due process 
right; prohibition of secondary use and the other 
requirements of lawful processing];
e. the prohibition to process sensitive data, which 
requires extra safeguards if overruled by consent.
5. In the case of a contract, a law or consent the following 
information obligations apply:
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and smart grids’ (Recital 8), urging MSs to stimulate and 
support ‘security and data protection by design’ in the 
early stages of development (Recital 11). Best available 
techniques are defined as referring ‘to the most effective 
and advanced stage in the development of activities and 
their methods of operation, which indicate the practical 
suitability of particular techniques for providing in principle 
the basis for complying with the EU data protection 
framework. They are designed to prevent or mitigate risks 
on privacy, personal data and security’ [art. 3(f)].
The Recommendation announces a template for 
conducting a DPIA, that is defined as meaning ‘a 
systematic process for evaluating the potential impact of 
risks where processing operations are likely to present 
specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects 
by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes to be 
to carried by the controller or processor or the processor 
acting on the controller’s behalf’ [art. 3(c)]. The template 
will be developed by the Commission and submitted to 
the Art. 29 WP for its Opinion, within 12 months after 
publication of the Recommendation. This means we 
should expect the template by March 2013. MSs should 
ensure that the advice of the Art. 29 WP is taken into 
account and they should take care that entities processing 
personal data should consult the national data protection 
supervisor on the DPIA, finally they must ensure that the 
template is adopted by network operators and operators 
of smart meters. 
As to the content of the DPIA the Commission 
recommends:
4. The data protection impact assessment should 
describe the envisaged processing operations, an 
assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects, the measures envisaged to address the 
risks, safeguards, security measures and mechanisms 
to ensure the protection of personal data and to 
demonstrate compliance with Directive 95/46/EC, 
taking into account the rights and legitimate interests 
of data subjects and persons concerned.
In its Opinion,84 the EDPS expresses doubts as to the 
soft law approach. Since the Recommendation does not 
have force of law it depends on voluntary application by 
the industry. The EDPS finds that various important data 
protection aspects are not fully addressed. Notably, it 
observes that:
by analysing detailed electricity usage data it may be 
possible in the future to infer or predict – also on a basis 
of deductions about the way in which electronic tools work 
- when members of a household are away on holidays or 
at work, when they sleep and awake, whether they watch 
television or use certain tolls or devices, or entertain guests 
in their free-time, how often they do their laundry, if someone 
uses a specific medical device or a baby-monitor, whether a 
kidney problem has suddenly appeared or developed over 
time, if anyone suffers from insomnia, or indeed whether 
individuals sleep in the same room [point 19]. 
The EDPS reminds us that patterns can be used for 
energy conservation, but also for many other purposes 
and have a high commercial value, for instance enabling 
price discrimination. It is unclear whether the EDPS is only 
referring to individual profiles, constructed from the data of 
one particular household, or also takes into account profiles 
mined from anonymized data. The EDPS applauds the 
recommendations of DPbDesign and DPbDefault but warns 
that the template for the DPIA should not be taken out of 
context and must always be interpreted with the relevant 
legal framework in mind. This is an important warning: I 
agree that law cannot be reduced to a template, even if a 
template can help to actualize its performance. Furthermore 
the EDPS calls on the Commission to assess whether 
legislative action is necessary to stipulate mandatory 
technological protection instead of merely recommending 
it. This seems pertinent, to create a level playing field for 
the industry. Finally, the EDPS finds that the DPIA should be 
part of the mandatory CBA, which reinforces the need to 
move the DPIA from soft law to real law. 
Design implications: 
1. Smart Grid initiators should not await the Commission’s 
template but actively foresee the kind of impact the Grid 
may have on data protection rights and obligations.
2. They should envisage how alternative designs impact 
e.g.: 
a. data minimisation; 
b. meaningful consent; 
c. data portability; 
d. the right to forget;
e. profile transparency.
3. Various types of user participation should be taken into 
consideration, and the ability of users to understand 
the implications of their choices as well as their 
monitored behaviour should be ensured. 
4. Designs that allow for high frequency trading with 
of processing. It might be the case that TSOs may not 
process any personal data, whereas the question whether 
DSOs, Energy Generators or Metering Operators are data 
controllers will depend on the way things are organised. 
Energy suppliers will at some point process personal 
data for the purpose of billing, so it is clear that they 
are controllers. Whether Metering Operators are merely 
processors or joint controllers depends on their role within 
the Smart Grid. 
Design implications: 
These will be discussed under the heading of ‘obligations’ 
and ‘liability’ hereunder. It is important to note, at this 
point, that the question is not whether a company or a 
public body designates itself as either a controller or a 
processor. This will be established on the basis of actual 
control and delegation. 
4.1.10 Obligations of the data controller and the data 
processor
Under the Directive, data controllers must inform data 
subjects of their identity, the purposes of processing, 
the recipients or categories of recipients of the data, the 
voluntary or obligatory nature of providing specific data, 
of their right to access, and of their right to rectify and 
to delete their data [art. 10 D 1995/46/EC]. Obviously, 
where the Directive stipulates rights of data subjects with 
regard to data controllers, these will involve obligations. 
The proposed GDPR stipulates those obligations directly 
under the heading of the rights of the data subject, opening 
this section with a general obligation, stating that [art. 11 
proposed GDPR]: 
1. The controller shall have transparent and easily 
accessible policies with regard to the processing of 
personal data and for the exercise of data subject’s 
rights
2. The controller shall provide any information and any 
communication relating to the processing of personal 
data to the data subject in an intelligible form, using 
clear and plain language, adapted to the data subject, 
in particular for any information addressed specifically 
to a child. 
This is an important reminder and in combination with the 
obligations of Data Protection by Design and Default these 
requirements should be met by inventing simple and easy 
to use software tools to concretize e.g. ‘data access by 
design’ or ‘profile access by design’. The obligations will be 
discussed under the Data Protection Impact Assessment, 
Confidentiality & Security and Breach Notification, Data 
Protection by Design.
4.1.10.1 Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)
The proposed Regulation stipulates a Data Protection 
Impact Assessment (DPIA), ‘where processing operations 
present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their 
purposes (art. 33). This is a new requirement, compared 
to the Directive. Though this may involve bureaucracy, it 
should in fact allow for a serious investigation into potential 
infringements of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
This will provide incentives and opportunities to build 
protection into the design of the devices or infrastructure, 
thus lowering risks and costs at a later point in time. 
A DPIA must be carried out whenever an application 
entails processing operations that 
 perform systematic and extensive evaluations of 
personal aspects, analysing or predicting economic 
situation, location, health, personal preferences, 
reliability of behaviour, based on automated processing; 
 regard sensitive data, epidemiological researches, 
surveys of mental or infectious diseases; 
 monitoring of publicly accessible areas; 
 personal data in large filing systems on children, 
genetic data or biometric data; 
 operations for which the consultation of the supervisory 
authority is required. 
The DPIA must contain at least a general description of 
the envisaged processing operations and an assessment 
of the risks to rights and freedoms, complemented with 
an assessment of the envisaged measures to address the 
risks. The controller shall seek the views of data subjects 
or their representatives. 
As mentioned above, the European Commission has 
issued a Recommendation on preparations for the roll-
out of smart metering systems.83 This Recommendation 
clearly links the Digital Agenda with smart metering and 
the smart grid, recognizing the need for data protection, 
network and information security, and cyber security. It 
refers to the guidance provided by various Opinions of 
the Art. 29 WP ‘for developing “best available techniques” 
to safeguard personal data and guarantee data security 
when data are processing in smart metering systems 
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and impose technical standards [art. 23.2 and 23.3 of the 
proposed Regulation].
Design implications are discussed at throughout the 
analysis of the Regulation.
4.1.12 Liability of the data controller and the 
processor for non-compliance
In the current EU legislation every person should be 
provided with a judicial remedy to complain about any 
breach of the rights guaranteed by the national law; the 
person should receive compensation from the controller 
for the damage suffered. Finally, MSs should adopt 
‘suitable measures to ensure the full implementation of 
the provisions of this Directive’. Many have concluded that 
the current legal framework ‘has not been successful in 
ensuring that data protection requirements translate into 
effective mechanisms that deliver real protection’.86 In its 
Opinion on the principle of accountability, the art. 29 WP 
has advocated a system whereby controllers must (1) 
take appropriate measures to comply with data protection 
legislation and (2) must be able to demonstrate that they 
have done so.87 The emphasis in the proposed Regulation 
on documentation and auditing requirements, discussed 
above, seems to follow this lead. At the same time it 
should be clear that straightforward and substantial liability 
will be needed to level the playing field, allowing controllers 
to inscribe data protection in the core of their business 
models without suffering a competitive disadvantage. In 
its report on the uptake of Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
(PETs), London Economics founds that many businesses 
claimed that they could only afford to make serious 
investments in PETs if their competitors were forced to do 
the same thing.88
Under the proposed Regulation data subjects can lodge 
individual complaints about the processing of their personal 
data with the supervisory authority. If unsuccessful the 
data subject has the right to a judicial remedy; she can 
go to court to contest the decision of the supervisory 
authority. This is a matter of administrative law. Just like in 
the case of the Directive, a natural person also has a right 
to a judicial remedy against a controller or processor; she 
can sue for compensation of any damage suffered and 
hold the controller or processor liable under private law. 
Next to this – under the Regulation - penalties and 
administrative sanctions can be imposed, which differ 
substantially from the vague and non-committal ‘suitable 
measures’ required by the Directive.  
The administrative sanctions consist of :
1. fines of up to 25.000 EUR or 0.5% of the annual 
worldwide turnover for intentional or negligent non-
compliance with the obligation to provide mechanism 
for requests by data subjects or for charging a fee for 
information where this is unlawful; 
2. Fines of up to 500.000 EUR  or 1% of the annual 
worldwide turnover for intentional or negligent non-
provision of transparent information, non-provision of 
access or rectification; non-compliance with the right 
to be forgotten; non-provision of a copy of personal 
data in electronic format or non-compliance with 
data portability; non-compliance with distribution 
of responsibility in the case of joint controllers; non-
compliance with required documentation; non-
compliance with the rules for freedom of information or 
the conditions for processing for historical, statistical 
and scientific research purposes;
3. Fines of up to 1.000.000 EUR or 2% of the annual 
worldwide turnover for intentional or negligent 
processing of personal data without a sufficient legal 
basis or in violation of the rules and principles of fair and 
lawful processing; a violation of the rules for processing 
sensitive data; non-compliance with an objection to 
measures based on profiling; non-adaption of internal 
policies to implement Data Protection by Design and 
by Default; not designating a representative within the 
EU; etc. etc. 
The sanctions remind one of sanctions more usual in 
competition law. Basically the supervisory authority, which 
can impose these fines, becomes a very powerful player 
and seems to be in a position to level the playing field by 
punishing those who try to game the system. 
Design implications: 
1. The liability of controllers and processors of personal 
data under the proposed Regulation will require the 
articulation of all mandatory rights and obligations of 
the data protection framework into the Smart Grid 
architecture.
2. Combined with 
a. the imposition of DPbDefault (data minimisation), 
b. DPbDesign (early uptake of all the relevant rules 
and principles in the architecture) 
c. the introduction of new rights such as data 
portability, and 
d. newly articulated rights such as the right to be 
forgotten and 
energy consumption behaviours (and the inferred data 
derivatives) must be avoided or at least separated from 
the data streams of the critical infrastructure since they 
will not empower the end-user and may cause volatility 
and unpredictable disruption of energy supply.
4.1.10.2 Confidentiality & security by design and 
breach notification
Under the current Directive, those charged with processing 
the personal data within the Smart Grid may only do so ‘on 
instructions from the controller, unless required to do so by 
law’ [art. 16]. The controllers ‘must implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures to protect personal 
data (…)’ [art. 17(1)]. In the case of security breaches that 
result in identity fraud, privacy infringements, individuals 
must be notified ‘when the personal data breach is likely 
to adversely affect the personal data or privacy of a 
subscriber or individual’, unless the provider demonstrates 
to the competent authority that is has taken appropriate 
technological protection measures. The telecom provider 
must always notify the competent authority of the 
breach. So far, the obligations relating to data breaches 
have been regulated in the ePrivacy Directive (art. 3), 
which only applies to providers of publicly available 
electronic communications services. Under the proposed 
Regulation, however, these obligations are extended to 
all data controllers (art. 31 of the proposed Regulation). 
The notification concerns breaches of personal data, 
‘when the personal data breach is likely to adversely 
affect the protection of the personal data or privacy of 
the data subject’ (art. 32 of the proposed Regulation). 
Similar exceptions apply if the controller demonstrates 
appropriate technological protection measures. 
In the case of the Smart Grid, based on remote readings, 
two-way communication and a massive amount of 
invisible machine-to-machine talk a high level of security 
and confidentiality is obviously required by the detailed 
information that is transported and inferred. In its 
Recommendation on the rollout of the smart meter, the 
European Commission advices ‘security by design’, 
meaning that it should be built into the architecture, as 
part of Data Protection by Design:
This should encompass measures to protect personal data 
against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental 
loss and to prevent any unlawful forms of processing, 
in particular any unauthorised disclosure, dissemination, 
access to or alteration of personal data [art. 24].
The Commission advices ‘the use of encrypted channels 
as it is one of the most effective technical means against 
misuse’ [art. 25]. It requires compliance with the ‘security-
relevant’ standard developed by European standardisation 
organisations, referring to its mandate85 M/490 and taking 
into account international security standards, notably the 
ISO/IEC 27000 series [art. 26]. 
Design implications: 
1. End-to-end encryption seems indeed imperative. It is 
unclear to me why this is not mandatory law. Though 
it will not solve all problems, it will reduce a number 
of problems that will otherwise require extensive 
investment at a later stage. 
2. Especially in the case of remote readings and wireless 
machine-to-machine communication between the 
Smart Grid and domotica, many security incidents can 
be prevented by imposing end-to-end encryption. 
3. Security by Design seems to be a prerequisite for 
a resilient infrastructure, since the cost of security 
breaches and ensuing system breakdowns would be 
exponential. 
4. As indicated above, while discussing the CBA, the 
economics of security warrant a separation of the data 
stream of the critical infrastructure from that of value 
added services.  
4.1.11 Data Protection by Design (DPbDesign)
In the Recommendation of the European Commission for 
the rollout of the smart meter, the EC defines DPbDesign 
as requiring ‘to implement, having regard to the state of 
the art and the cost of implementation, both at the time 
of the determination of the means for processing and at 
the time of the processing itself, appropriate technical and 
organisational measures and procedures in such a way 
that the processing will meet the requirements of Directive 
95/46/EC and ensure the protection of the rights of the 
data subject’ [art. 3(d)].
The proposed Regulation stipulates a similar engagement 
with up-stream requirements engineering to ensure 
compliance with the rights and obligations of the 
Regulation. This will enforce business leaders to make 
data protection a part of their business plan.
It seems clear that DPbD will be a standard based on 
technical and economic feasibility, involving a measure of 
legal uncertainty and negotiation. Much will depend on the 
way the Commission will use its competence to negotiate 
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4.3 Council Framework Decision  
2008/977/Jha and the proposed  
Police and Criminal Justice Data 
Protection Directive
The recently adopted Council Framework Decision that 
regulates the Data Protection for police and criminal 
justice is only applicable to cross-border exchanges of 
personal data within the framework of police and judicial 
cooperation. It entails minimum harmonisation, meaning 
that MSs can provide a higher level of data protection 
than required by the Framework Decision. It is not valid 
for data processing in the national context of police and 
criminal investigation, which also does not fall within the 
scope of the general DPD. This evidently creates many 
gaps in protection and lack of legal certainty within the EU. 
The Framework Decision basically extends and restricts 
the framework of the DPD. Though both legal instruments 
focus on the processing of personal data, the role of 
consent of the data subject as well as various information 
obligations for those who process data are mitigated. 
This relates to the specific conditions under which data 
is exchanged and processed between police and justice 
authorities. Art. 3 highlights the principles of lawfulness, 
proportionality and purpose. It e.g. stipulates that ‘personal 
data may be collected by the competent authorities only 
for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’ and ‘may be 
processed only for the same purpose for which data were 
collected’ and ‘shall be lawful and adequate, relevant and 
not excessive in relation to the purposes fro which they 
are collected’. As mentioned above, the art. 29 WP has 
warned, in its Opinion on data retention, that the usage of 
traffic data should not involve indiscriminate profiling, but 
always be specific and involve the necessary safeguards. 
The protection of personal data in the sphere of criminal 
justice is weak, due to the exceptions that are made to 
enable criminal investigation and security measures. 
Similar exceptions are made in the draft Directive on data 
protection in the sphere of criminal justice. The proposed 
Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive will, 
however, be applicable to data processing within the MSs, 
thus closing some of the gaps in the present system. But the 
level of legal certainty will be lower than desirable since MSs 
will have to implement the Directive into national legislation, 
allowing for latitude between MSs. As to content the 
Framework Decision and the Directive do not differ much. 
The European Data Protection Supervisor has expressed 
his concern about the new proposal for a Directive, with 
regard to: the lack of legal certainty about the further use of 
personal data by law enforcement authorities; the lack of a 
general duty for law enforcement authorities to demonstrate 
compliance with data protection requirements; the weak 
conditions for transfers to third countries; the unduly limited 
powers of supervisory authorities.96 
It is a fact that Smart Grid data will at some point be 
accessed by police and justice authorities to conduct 
criminal investigations, and/or to use such data to detect 
e.g. social security fraud or tax evasion. Like in the case of 
access to traffic data on telephone or Internet traffic, and the 
interception of telephone content and telecommunications 
content, the temptation for justice and police to eavesdrop 
on the behaviours of their citizens will be substantial. 
Putting in place the necessary safeguards, such as those 
mentioned above, complemented with transparency and 
due process rights, is not only a matter of legislation. By 
designing the Smart Grid in a way that per default does 
not invite easy access to individual data, or to detailed 
group profiles based on artificial intelligence, unwarranted 
monitoring may be discouraged. Public private partnership 
should, in this case, not focus on how data mining based 
on consent within the private sector can be transferred to 
the public sector. It should – on the contrary - focus on how 
to prevent privacy, data protection, non-discrimination and 
due process to become empty shells. Systemic monitoring 
by justice authorities violates democratic standards and 
defies the safeguards of the Rule of Law; they undermine 
trust and may endanger the resilience of the Smart Grid. 
They are, however, not science fiction, as the Judgment 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court indicates, 
whereby it created a new fundamental right to the integrity 
and confidentiality of Information Technology Systems in 
response to legislation allowing intelligence operations 
that search computing systems by using malware (e.g. 
a Trojan horse).97 The point of the Court was not that 
computer systems may never be ‘hacked’ by police or 
justice authorities, but that this should be restricted to 
specific instances that are foreseeable and conditioned by 
the necessary safeguards.
Design implications: 
1. Smart grid operators should foresee that, especially 
in the context of fraud detection or tax evasion, law 
enforcement may seek ways to access energy usage 
data. This may concern either the usage data of a 
specific person, who is already under suspicion or Big 
Data that allow to create data derivatives deemed to 
aid criminal intelligence. 
e. rights against unwarranted profiling the imposition 
of liability will force the industry to innovate on the 
basis of a level playing field. 
3. Techniques, technologies, applications, hardware, 
code, software and protocols will be invented and/or 
reinvented to make data protection part and parcel of 
the business model of advanced smart environments. 
4. The development of the Smart Grid will benefit from 
early investment into security and privacy by design, 
preventing rising costs of ICT maintenance and 
preventing dangerous fluctuations in consumer trust. 
Those who fail to comply will be out of business.
4.2 ePrivacy Directive 2002/58 and the Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24
The scope of the ePrivacy Directive is limited ‘to the 
processing of personal data in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services in public communications networks’ (art. 3).89 
This – in principle – excludes ‘information society services’, 
because the scope of the ePrivacy Directive is restricted 
to publicly available transmissions of communications. To 
complicate matters various parts of the ePrivacy Directive 
are deemed to address data processing outside publicly 
available electronic communications services in public 
networks, notably the prior informed consent required for 
cookies and unsolicited communications.90
The ePrivacy Directive contains a data breach notification 
that is now part of the proposed Regulation (see above), 
and it contains detailed opt-in requirements for the use of 
cookies for the purpose of marketing or targeted services. 
Notably, since 2009 the Directive requires prior informed 
consent for the use of cookies for value added services. 
This does not depend on whether the relevant data are 
personal data. Anonymisation therefore does not exempt 
from the obligation to inform and acquire consent, though 
it does exempt from the rules and principles on fair and 
lawful processing of personal data in the DPD. To the 
extent that added value is created by means of tracking 
mechanisms that resemble cookies the ePrivacy Directive 
is relevant for the Smart Grid. The art. 29 WP, for instance, 
explains that the term ‘cookie’ ‘should not be regarded as 
excluding similar technologies’, and goes on to analyse 
two exemptions from the requirement of informed consent, 
namely (A) when a cookie is used ‘for the sole purpose 
of carrying out the transmission of a communication over 
an electronic communications network’ or (B) when a 
cookie is ‘strictly necessary in order for the provider of 
an information society service explicitly requested by the 
subscriber or user to provide the service’.91 Since value 
added services on the Smart Grid fall within the scope 
of the cookie legislation, any tracking mechanism used 
for such services that resembles cookie technologies will 
require prior and informed consent even if data are not 
considered personal data.92 
At this moment it is not clear to me to what extent, in 
which cases and under what conditions smart grid data 
will be considered traffic data and/or location data in 
the sense of the ePrivacy Directive. This will depend on 
whether the transmission of data takes place via a public 
communications network and should be considered as 
publicly available communication services.93 If Smart 
Grid data are communicated via publicly available 
communications services or transmitted via public 
communication networks, the Data Retention Directive will 
be also be applicable, requiring the retention of traffic data 
for a specified period of time (MSs have latitude between 
6-24 months, the Netherlands has opted for 12 months). 
The goal of the Directive was to aid the investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime. The art. 29 
WP noted in its Opinion that ‘Investigation, detection and 
prosecution of offences referred to in the Directive should 
not entail large-scale data-mining based on retained data, 
in respect of the travel and communication patterns of 
people unsuspected by law enforcement authorities’.94 We 
should note that various Constitutional Courts have struck 
down either the Directive or its national implementation as 
a violation of their Constitution.95 See also above (section 
3a.8A) on the newly articulated ‘right to be forgotten’ in the 
proposed Regulation. 
Design implications: 
If energy usage behaviour data are transmitted by means 
of a publicly available communication service or network: 
1. Tracking mechanisms such as cookies require 
informed prior consent;
2. Traffic data must be retained in accordance with 
the national law that implements the Data Retention 
Directive; such data must be accessible for law 
enforcement under strict conditions in specific cases.
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of high level data mining activities, to aid in the struggle 
against international terrorism, money laundering, child 
pornography or any other transnational crime. Even if this 
would be in violation of art. 25 and 26 of the current Data 
Protection Directive or art. 40-45 of the proposed Regulation, 
we might not be aware of such transfers and the trouble 
around the agreement on the transfer of EU air passengers’ 
personal data to the US Department of Homeland Security 
and the EU-US agreement on financial data transfers via 
the SWIFT network are a case in point that compliance 
is not obvious.105 The Art. 29 WP in fact finds that ‘it is of 
the utmost importance to add to the future Regulation that 
controllers operating in the EU must be prohibited from 
disclosing personal data to a third country if so requested 
by a third country’s judicial or administrative authority, unless 
this is expressly authorized by an international agreement or 
provided for by mutual legal assistance treaties or approved 
by a supervisory authority’.106 
As to profiling, the problem would also be that knowledge 
mined from aggregated, anonymized Smart Grid data 
could be used against EU citizens traveling into the US or 
any other country that manages to gain access to such 
aggregate knowledge. In fact, such inferences are not 
personal data and thus not protected by the DPD or the 
Regulation. The transparency rights of art. 12 of the DPD 
and art. 20 of the proposed Regulation may apply to the 
application of such profiles, but the chance that we can 
exercise these rights can be deemed null and void when 
invoke across the EU borders. 
Design implications:
4. Smart Grid operations that concern critical 
infrastructure should not be managed in public clouds 
for reason of energy availability, grid resilience and 
other security, privacy and data protection concerns.
5. Smart Grid applications that concern added value 
services should not be run in public clouds because of 
increased data protection risks.
6. To the extent that private clouds could provide benefits 
in terms of security, privacy and data protection, 
decisions on their employment and the relevant 
conditions should be part of the DPIA.
4.4.2 US approaches to energy usage data
As an afterthought it is interesting to note that within the 
Utilities Commission of the State of California has proposed 
to fund an ‘Energy Data Center’.107 In its whitepaper it 
makes a difference between (1) customer-specific data 
that would reveal personally identifiable information, which 
can only be obtained with a Non-Disclosure Agreement 
(NDA), and (2) aggregated and anonymous data. The 
paper mainly addresses the need for aggregated and 
anonymous data. Basically the paper suggests that ‘by 
eliminating the utility as the gate-keeper for obtaining 
aggregated and anonymized data, it may allow for a more 
open process for governmental organizations and other 
researchers to obtain this type of data’.108 Three possible 
roles are distinguished:109
1. Aggregate and anonymize customer-specific data 
such that it protects customers’ privacy and make it 
available to the public in a timely manner;
2. Provide independent research and analysis of current 
state, Commission, and utility programs using 
customer-specific data but publishing results of that 
analysis in an aggregated and anonymised form that 
protects customers’ privacy;
3. Facilitate the transfer of customer-specific data to a 
governmental organization, provided that governmental 
organization has an NDA with the Commission.
The paper notes that customer usage data are confidential 
and disclosure requires written consent, unless this 
concerns ‘generic information regarding the usage, load 
shape, or other general characteristics of a gropu or 
rate classification, unless the release of that information 
would reveal customer specific information because of 
the size of the group, rate classification, or nature of the 
information’.110 However ‘nothing […] shall preclude an 
electrical corporation or gas corporation from disclosing 
a customer’s electrical or gas consumption data to 
a third party for system, grid, or operational needs, 
or the implementation of demand response, energy 
management, or energy efficiency programs, provide 
that […] the utility has required by contract that the 
third party implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of 
the information, to protect the personal information from 
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or 
disclosure, and prohibits the use of data for a secondary 
commercial purpose not related to the primary purpose 
of the contract without the customer’s consent’.111 The 
Utilities Commission has invited comments and schedule 
workshops to determine whether funding an Energy Data 
Center is in the public interest. It may be obvious that such 
a central data base raises a number of privacy issues, 
notably with regard to profile transparency.   
2. To the extent possible the architecture should prevent 
and rule out easy access to large amounts of energy 
usage data as this would be contrary to the principle 
of purpose binding. In individual cases and under 
strict legal conditions access should be enabled and 
it would help if the architecture has a default setting 
against easy access.
3. This is especially urgent for either specific personal 
data or Big Data collected by third parties who may 
be tempted to provide such specific or aggregated, 
anonymised data on a voluntory basis. Though this 
would obviously violate the legal requirements of 
data minimisation (purpose limitation, prohibition of 
secondary use without explicit consent), it may be 
difficult to audit such violations after the data have 
been anonymised.
4.4 Cloud computing and the transfer of 
personal data outside the European 
Economic Area (EEA) & US approaches 
to energy usage data
4.4.1 Cloud computing and the transfer of personal 
data outside the EEA
The Art. 29 WP writes about cloud computing as ‘a 
global technological paradigm’.98 The issue in this report 
is not whether Smart Grid providers will derive benefits 
from cloud computing, but focuses on the risks in terms 
of data protection. The art. 29 WP highlights the risks of 
a increased lack of control and insufficient information 
regarding the processing operations themselves:99
a. Lack of availability ‘due to lack of interoperability 
(vendor lock-in)’;
b. Lack of integrity ‘caused by sharing of resources’ (e.g. 
in case of conflicting interests);
c. Lack of confidentiality (notably in case of ‘law 
enforcement requests made directly to the cloud 
provider’);
d. Lack of transparency due to the complexity and 
dynamics of the outsourcing chain;
e. Lack of intervenability (for the client and/or for the data 
subject) ‘due to the complexity and dynamics of the 
outsourcing chain’;
f. Lack of isolation (which would endanger unlinkability 
of personal data processed for different clients and 
jeopardize purpose limitation);
g. Lack of portability (‘standard data formats and service 
interfaces’);
h. Lack of accountability (‘ability to establish what an entity 
did at a certain point in time in the past and how’).
The Art. 29 WP notes that cloud clients are obligated ‘to 
choose cloud providers that implement adequate technical 
and organisational security measures to protect personal 
data and to be able to demonstrate accountability’.100 It 
is not entirely clear whether the Art. 29 WP is referring to 
public or private clouds or to both. This is relevant since 
they seem to have entirely different privacy and data 
protection implications.101 
Special attention should be devoted to the transfer 
of personal data to third countries or international 
organisations. This is relevant insofar as network 
operators, energy suppliers or ESCos make use of cloud 
computing, whereby data are transferred to data servers 
outside the territory of the EEA, or transferred to data 
servers run by companies that fall under a jurisdiction 
that may e.g. require them to share personal data with 
justice authorities outside the EU without notification 
to the relevant data subject. Though nobody is entirely 
clear about the risks of US Justice authorities requesting 
personal data held by US companies in data servers on 
the territory of the EU, it seems clear that governments 
outside the EU could indeed request and beget access 
to personal data.102 Network operators, energy suppliers 
or ESCos qualify as data controllers, whereas cloud 
providers qualify as data processors. This means that the 
Smart Grid providers are responsible for compliance with 
data protection legislation. Transfer of data outside the EU 
and the European Economic Area (EEA) may only take 
place ‘the third country in question ensures an adequate 
level of protection’.103 In relation to the US – which has 
a different framework of data protection that does not 
always comply with that of the EU – the US Department 
of Commerce has develop a so-called ‘safe harbor 
framework’, together with the European Commission. It 
allows US companies to certify compliance with the US-
EU Safe Harbor Framework, entailing compliance with 
the Directive. The art. 29 WP, however, considers that 
‘companies exporting data should not merely rely on the 
statement of the data importer claiming that he has a Safe 
Harbor certification’.104
The proliferation of private public partnerships (PPP) may 
at some point lead to governments requesting the results 
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Data collection by law enforcement authorities in the Smart 
Grid or the construction of criminal profiles based on 
data derivatives taken from Big Data in the context of the 
Smart Grid, may violate privacy. If a violation is not justified 
on the basis of art. 8 ECHR this can have specific legal 
effects, such as inadmissability of the charge, acquittal, or 
diminishment of punishment. The problem is that this only 
goes when the defendant’s privacy was violated unlawfully, 
not when that of others has been violated. The second 
problem is that as long as data collected is not used in the 
court case, the violation may never surface. 
Access to data for preventive purposes without a specific 
relation to a particular criminal offense will in general not 
be justifiable, though anonymisation may be deemed an 
adequate safeguard. 
4.6.3 Non-discrimination
Art. 14 of the Convention stipulates a prohibition to 
discriminate ‘on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status’, when taking measures that violate 
their human rights to e.g. privacy or a fair trial.117 This is 
of particular interest when criminal profiling data mining 
technologies are run on energy usage data, since they 
may lead to discrimination in the exercise of the right to 
privacy, the presumption of innoncence or other rights in 
the context of the fair trial. 
4.6.4 Horizontal effect
Human rights protection stems from the need to protect 
individual citizens against the powers of the state, which 
are used to achieve such protection [this is called the 
paradox of the Rule of Law]. The relationship between 
citiens and state is generally seen as vertical, because 
the state has unilateral competence to decide the legal 
relations between citizens and between citizens and the 
state. To the extent that states have a positive obligation 
to protect citizens against violation of their human rights 
by other private parties, lawyers speak of the horizontal 
effect.118 Especially in the case of private parties that 
provide critical infrastructure the state may be held 
responsible for not preventing violations of human rights 
by those involved in distributing, supplying and supporting 
public goods that require universal service. 
This report, however, addresses those involved in creating 
a Smart Grid. Therefore the focus is on the rights and 
obligations of the generators, suppliers, distributors and 
consumers of energy in the context of the Smart Grid. 
Within the EU these rights and obligations are codified in 
the legal framework of data protection. 
This section aims to confront current and future ‘settings’ 
of the EU legal framework on privacy, data protection and 
other fundamental rights, notably non-discrimination and 
due process. The focus will be on the implications of the 
profiling technologies that render the Grid a Smart Grid. 
Design implications will be indicated. They – obviously 
– require further study between lawyers, engineers, 
designers and business leaders.
This report cannot provide anything like a comprehensive 
account of US privacy law with regard to the Smart Grid. 
It is important to note that the US jurisdiction has a very 
specific and complex division of tasks and competences 
between federal and state legislations; applicability of 
federal privacy law is not certain; and note should be 
taken that privacy law is far less general than the EU legal 
framework of data protection legislation. Much is regulated 
at the level of specific branches of the industry and much 
is left to state legislation.112 
4.5 The margin of appreciation for MSs
Since the proposed Regulation will unify EU law regarding 
data protection, the legal framework for the Smart Grid 
will not longer allow a margin of appreciation concerning 
data protection.113 This is in fact one of the main goals 
of the Regulation: creating a level playing field within the 
EU internal market for energy generation, distribution 
and transportation. The measure of legal certainty should 
increase once all MSs are bound by the same rules, to be 
interpreted in a more consistent manner.114 
The ePrivacy Directive and the proposed Police and 
Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive (replacing the 
Council Framework Decision) will continue to provide 
latitude for diversity between EU MSs. The EDPS laments 
the lack of legal certainty that will continue in the domain 
of law enforcement. 
4.6 Art. 6, 8 And 14 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
It cannot be assumed that compliance with the Data 
Protection Legislation will automatically ensure compliance 
with the fundamental rights of privacy, non-discrimination 
and due process in the ECHR. These rights concern the 
relationship between the government and citizens, and 
are especially relevant with regard to both specific or 
more general access to data or data derivatives by law 
enforcement authorities. There is much to discuss here, 
but within the scope of this study, written for the Smart 
Energy Collective and not addressing the government, 
the focus is the Data Protection framework that clearly 
addresses private actors.  
The Convention has direct legal force: it has to be applied 
by the MSs whether or not they have implemented 
legislation, and art. 13 requires that a right to an effective 
remedy is provided. Merely enacting a law is not enough 
for compliance, the substance of the relevant right must 
be protected. A resident in Europe can file a complaint 
with the European Court of Justice if she has exhausted 
all national legal remedies. This means that it may take 
many years to achieve success, but it also means that any 
person within the jurisdiction of the Convention who finds 
her rights violated can turn to the court and file a complaint 
against the relevant Member State. 
4.6.1 Privacy
Art. 8 protects privacy, private life, home and 
correspondance.115 The scope of this right is determined 
by the reasonable expectation of privacy at home, work, 
concerning family life and the content of any type of 
communication. Violation is only justified in the case of the 
following triple test:
1. There is a legitimate aim that is well specified and falls 
within the scope of one of the following aims: national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others;
2. The infringement is based on a law that is foreseeable, 
accessible, effectively implemented and containing the 
necessary and specified safeguards; 
3. The infringement is necessary in a democratic society 
and proportial in respect of the legitimate aim.
We can assume that access to energy usage data is an 
infringement of privacy. This implies that any access by 
law enforcement must meet the requirements of the triple 
test. The obligations to fulfill these requirements rest with 
the government, but it is important that grid operators are 
aware of the fact that the human right of privacy is at stake 
and police, justice authorities, or any other governmental 
agency has to comply with art. 8. 
4.6.2 Due process, fair trial
Art. 6 of the ECHR provides a set of specific rights in the 
case of a criminal charge.116 These requirements concern 
the to a fair trial: a public hearing, before an independent 
tribunal, contradictory proceedings, equality of arms during 
the trail and immediacy of the presentation of evidence. 
The main thrust of these requirements are that it allows a 
defendant to contest the charge, the evidence, but also 
the lawfullness of various methods of investigation. 
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 1. Think in terms of data flows instead of isolated 
discrete data; foresee whether de-anonymisation will 
reinstate identifiability and treat data streams that are 
susceptible to such de-anonymisation as falling within 
the scope of data protection legislation.
 2. Make privacy and security an essential part of your 
business-model, do not treat them as costs but as a 
competitive advantage – especially in the long run.
 3. Start from and reiterate Data Protection Impact 
Assessments.
 4. Practice Data Protection by Design and by Default.
 5. Develop software tools and hardware infrastructure 
that is innovative in terms of DPbDesign and by Default.
 6. Develop business models based on DPbDesign and 
by Default.
 7. Practice Security by Design, notably end-to-end 
encryption and secure authentication wherever 
possible.
 8. Invest in recurrent software analyses.
 9. Practice discrimination-aware data mining.
10. Base your trust management on trustworthiness.
11. Never underestimate the recurrent cost of safety and 
security.
12. Don’t allow critical infrastructure to depend on volatile 
markets.
13. Create separate data streams for (1) critical 
infrastructure that protects the right to universal 
service, and (2) commercial value added services.
14. Design profile transparency in the back-end of the 
Smart Grid system.
15. Design intuitive interfaces that provide transparency 
about the potential consequences of sharing one’s 
data (showing what profiles they match).
16. Design for profile transparency in the front-end of the 
Smart Grid system (allow consumers to play around 
with their data to figure out how they are matched).
5 Concluding Statements
The analyses in chapters 3 and 4 prepared an answer to 
the questions articulated in the introduction. The answer 
consistes of a set of design implications derived from 
the legal framework. These design implications have 
been summarised in terms of legal requirements and 
proposed technical solutions in chapter 2. In this chapter 
the answers to the questions are briefly taken up as 
concluding statements.
The first question was: 
Which should be the requirements for the complex network 
of machine-to-machine interactions within the Smart Grid 
so as to prevent illegitimate and unlawful violations of 
privacy law and data protection legislation? 
This question has mainly been answered by an analysis 
of the current and upcoming legal framework on privacy 
and data protection within the EU. The legal requirements 
can be summarised in terms of three sets of rights and 
obligations. First, the obligation for the data controllers to 
perform a data protection impact assessment whenever 
the implications of data processing constitute  substantial 
risks for rights and freedoms of energy end-consumers. 
Second, to implement data minimisation at the level of 
the architecture; this has been coined as data protection 
by default. Third, data controllers must implement 
transparency and other obligations and ensure an effective 
right to be forgotten, an effective right to data portability 
and other relevant rights at the level of the architecture; 
this has been coined data protection by design. In chapter 
2 the legal requirements and various potential technical 
solutions have been summarised in terms of these three 
sets of rights and obligations.
The first subquestion was: 
How is the right to profile-transparency articulated within 
the EU legal framework and how can this right be turned 
into an effective right without necessarily destroying 
business models based on value added services? 
This question was answered in reference to the right for 
individuals not be subject to automated decisions, except 
on condition of a contract, a law or consent. Whenever 
such a condition is fulfilled, data controllers must provide 
transparency about (1) the existence of the automated 
decisions and (2) their envisaged effects for energy end-
consumers. In chapter 2 this transparency has been 
discussed briefly in terms of back-end, front-end and 
interface.
This question was followed by a second subquestion: 
How can energy consumers be involved in such business-
models as data prosumers, sharing the benefits of 
advanced data analytics? 
Can we have our cakes and eat them too? In chapter 2 
various architectural articulations have been proposed 
to enable energy consumers to become data and data 
derivative prosumers, under the heading of a user centric 
personal data ecosystem.
In section 2.3 a set of general recommendations is 
provided that advice how legal protection by design may 
be achieved in the Smart Grid:
Legal Protection by Design in Smart Grids
52
Prof. mr. dr. Mireille Hildebrandt of Radboud University Nijmegen
53
address the risks, safeguards, security measures and 
mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and 
to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation, taking 
into account the rights and legitimate interests of data 
subjects and other persons concerned’.
Data subject
Art. 2.a DPD: ‘an identified or identifiable natural person’. 
Recital 26: ‘to determine whether a person is identifiable, 
account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably 
to be used either by the controller or by any other person 
to identify the said person; whereas the principles of 
protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in 
such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable’.
Due Process and fair trial
This right stems from the context of criminal procedure and 
refers to the right to contest a criminal charge. It includes: 
the right to an independent tribunal, to external and internal 
publicity, to contradictory proceedings, to the presumption 
of innocence, to equality of arms, and to immediacy during 
trial. In a broader sense due process refers to the right to 
contest the way one is treated whenever such treatment 
has a significant impact on one’s life.
Non-discrimination
As a human right this refers to prohibited discrimination, 
i.e. discrimination on grounds such as race, ethnic 
origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade-union 
membership, genetic profile, health, sex life, criminal 
conviction or other security measures. It is connected 
with the right to equal treatment and to the prohibition to 
process data revealing such characteristics (art. 8 of the 
DPD and art. 9 of the proposed GDPR). 
Personal Data
Art. 2.a DPD: ‘”personal data” shall mean any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identification number or to one or more factors specific 
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity’.
Privacy
The right to privacy is defined in a number of ways. 
Four dimensions impact the current understanding of 
privacy: (1) the right to be left alone, (2) control over the 
sharing or hiding of one’s personal data, (3) freedom from 
unreasonable contraints on the construction of one’s 
identity. Spatial, physical privacy is distinguished from 
informational privacy and decisional privacy. The right 
is closely linked to autonomy and identity and is mostly 
seen as an opacity right, because it shields citizens from 
transparency to governmental agencies, fellow citizens or 
corporations. 
Profile transparency
Art. 20 proposed GDPR: ‘a measure which produces legal 
effects concerning a natural person or significantly affects 
her, and which is based solely on automated processing 
intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to 
this natural person or to analyse or predict in particular her 
performance at work, economic situation, location, health, 
personal preferences, realiability or behaviour’, and which 
is justified by means of contract, law or consent, requires 
that the controller provides information ‘as to the existence 
of processing for [such a measure] and the envisaged 
effects of such processing on the data subject’.
For reasons of precision the legal terminology is defined in 
accordance with the relevant legal text, when applicable.
Art. 29 Working Party
Art. 29 DPD: ‘Working Party on the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data. (…) It 
shall have advisory status and act independently. The 
Working Party shall be composed of a representative of 
the supervisory authority or authorities designated by each 
Member State and of a representative of the authority or 
authorities established for the Community institutions and 
bodies, and of a representative of the Commission’. 
Data controller
Art. 2.d DPD: ‘the natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data’.
Data Derivative
A data derivative is knowledge or information that is inferred 
or derived from a data set, based on patterns mined by 
means of computational techniques such as clustering, 
association rules, regression analyses, neural networks, 
reinforcement learning, unsupervised algorithms and the 
more. The data derivative is the result of what is usually 
termed artificial intelligence. It does not refer to the result of 
a query (retrieval of information first put into the database). 
Data processing
Art. 2.b DPD: ‘any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
blocking, erasure or destruction’.
Note that mere recording, collection but also anonymisation 
all fall within the scope of ‘data processing’. 
Data processor
Art. 2.e DPD: ‘a natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or any other body which processes personal data 
on behalf of the controller’.
Data Protection by Default
Art. 23.2 proposed GDPR: ‘The controller shall implement 
mechanisms for ensuring that, by default, only those 
personal data are processed which are necessary for 
each specific purpose of the processing and are especially 
not collected or retained beyond the minimum necessary 
for those purposes, both in terms of the amount of the 
data and the time of their storage. In particular, those 
mechanisms shall ensure that by default personal data are 
not made accessible to an indefinite number of individuals’.
Data Protection by Design
Art. 23.1 proposed GDPR: ‘Having regard to the state 
of the art and the cost of implementation, the controller 
shall, both at the time of the determination of the means 
for processing and at the time of the processing itself, 
implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures and procedures in such a way that the 
processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation 
and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject’. 
Data Protection Impact Assessment
Art. 33 proposed GDPR:  ‘an assessment of the impact 
of the envisaged processing operations on the protection 
of personal data. (…) The assessment shall contain at 
least a general description of the envisaged processing 
operations, an assessment of the risks to the rights and 
freedoms of data subjects, the measures envisaged to 
6 Glossary
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8 Annex: Eu Legal 
Framework Sources
Smart Grid Eu Legal Framework
Portal European Commission with regard to Smart Grid:  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/smartgrids_en.htm 
Portal European Commission with regard to the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER): http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/acer/acer_en.htm 
Right to universal service
Art. 14 and 106.2 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on services of 
general economic interest (SGEI) and on undertakings entrusted with SGEI, via:  
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm  
Art. 36 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFEU) on SGEI, via:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm 
Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC that qualifies electronic communications networks 
as universal services and stipulates requirements for availability, rights of end-users and 
corresponding obligations for providers:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0022:EN:HTML 
Energy efficiency
Portal European Commission on the Single market for gas & electricity:  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/internal_market_en.htm 
Directive 2006/32/EC on energy end-use efficiency and energy services, via:  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/energy_efficiency/l27057_en.htm 
Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency, repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0001:0056:EN:PDF 
Renewable energy resources
Directive 2009/28/EC on the use of energy from renewable resources, via:  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/renewable_energy/en0009_en.htm 
AI Artificial Intelligence
AIMA Artificial Intelligence the Modern Approach
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Art. 29 WP Art. 29 Working Party
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis
CEN European Commettee for Standardization
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization
DADM Discrimination Aware Datamining
DNO  Distribution Network Operator
DPD Data Protection Directive
DPIA Data Protection Impact Assessment
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor
EIA US Energy Information Administration
EPRI Electrical Power Research Institute
ESCo Energy Service Company
ESO European Standardisation Organisation
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute
FIP Fair Information Principles
GOFAI Good Old Fashioned AI
JRC Joint Research Center
KDD Knowledge Discovery in Databases
MSs  Member States (of the European Union)
NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement (US)
DPbDesign  Data Protection by Design
DPbDefault  Data Protection by Default
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
PPDM Privacy Preserving Datamining
PDE Personal Data Ecosystem
PPP  Private Public Partnership
SGEI Services of General Economic Interest
SG-CG Smart Grid Coordination Group (ESOs)
SM-CG Smart Metering Coordination Group (ESOs)
TEN-E Trans-European Network for Energy
7 Abbreviations
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Opinion on the Commission Recommendation 2012/148/EC of the European Data Protection 




Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC) Guidelines for Cost Benefit Analysis 
of Smart Metering Deployment:  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=2820&dt_code=HLN&obj_id=734 
JRC Guidelines for Cost Benefit Analysis of Smart Grid projects:  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=1410&obj_id=14810&dt_code=NWS&lang 
Proposed Regulation on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0658:FIN:EN:HTML 
Fundamental Rights Legal Framework
Charter Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFEU)
CFEU: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm 
European Court of Justice: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
European Court of Human Rights: http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/homepage_EN 
Fact sheets on case law:  
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/header/press/information+sheets/factsheets 
Data Protection
Art. 8 CFEU on the Protection of personal data, via:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm
General Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML 
ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0058:20091219:EN: 
HTML 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA for police and criminal justice, via:  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_
criminal_matters/jl0018_en.htm 
Reform and common rules for the internal energy market
Portal European Commission on Network Codes & Guidelines:  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/codes/codes_en.htm 
Directive 2009/72/EC with common rules for the internal market for electricity:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0072:en:NOT 
Directive 2009/73/EC with common rules for the internal market for natural gas:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0094:0136:fr:PDF 
Standardization
Mandate M/441, Standardization Mandate to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the field of 
measuring instruments for the development of an open architecture for utility meters involving 
communication protocols enabling interoperability:  
http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/Sectors/Measurement/Documents/M441.pdf
See also: http://www.cencenelec.eu/standards/HotTopics/SmartMeters/Pages/default.aspx 
Mandate M/490, Standardization Mandate to European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) to 





Measuring Instruments Directive 2004/22/EC, via:   
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_for_goods/technical_
harmonisation/l21009b_en.htm 
Art. 13.1 of Directive 2006/32/EC that conditionally obligates the roll-out of the Smart Meter, via: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006L0032:EN:HTML 
Opinion 12/2011 on Smart Metering (WP 183) of the Art. 29 Working Party:  
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/documents/rfid-pia-framework-a29wp-
opinion-11-02-2011_en.pdf 
Smart Grids Task Force Expert Group 2 of the Directorate-General Energy, Essential Regulatory 
Requirements and Recommendations for Data Handling, Data Safety, and Consumer 
Protection. Recommendation to the European Commission, Brussels, 5 December 2011:  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/smartgrids/doc/expert_group2.pdf 
Recommendation 2012/148/EC of the European Commisssion on the Rollout of Smart Metering 
Systems, containing in the Anness the Common minimum functional requirements for every 
smart metering system for electricity (see especially art. 42):  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:073:0009:0022:EN:PDF 
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Opinion 05/2012 (WP196) of the Art. 29 WP on cloud computing:  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/
files/2012/wp196_en.pdf 




Art. 13 CFEU on non-discrimination, via: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm 
Directive 2000/78/EC on discrimination in the context of occupation or employment:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML 
Directive 2000/43/EC on racial discrimination:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0043:en:HTML 
Art. 14 European Convention of Human Rights, via: http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html 
Privacy
Art. 7 CFEU on respect for private and family life, via:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm
Art. 8 European Convention of Human Rights, via:  
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html and http://www.echr.coe.int/Library/DIGDOC/
Roagna2012_EN.pdf 
Factsheet Case Law European Court of Human Rights on data protection:  
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/4FCF8133-AD91-4F7B-86F0-A448429BC2CC/0/
FICHES_Protection_des_données_EN.pdf 




Art. 47-50 CFEU on the rights to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, presumption of 
innocence and right of defence, principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and 
penalties, right not to be tried of punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal 
offence, via: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm
Art. 6 European Convention of Human Rights, via:  
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html and http://www.echr.coe.int/Library/DIGDOC/
Vitkauskas2012_EN.pdf 
Recommendation 2012/148/EC of the European Commisssion on the Rollout of Smart Metering 
Systems, containing Common minimum functional requirements for every smart metering 
system for electricity (advocating Data Protection Impact Assessment and Data Protection by 
Design:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:073:0009:0022:EN:PDF 
Proposed General Data Protection Regulation of 25th January 2012:  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf 
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